/**
* \file ssl.h
*
* \brief SSL/TLS functions.
*/
/*
* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
*/
#ifndef MBEDTLS_SSL_H
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_H
#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
#include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
#include "mbedtls/build_info.h"
#include "mbedtls/bignum.h"
#include "mbedtls/ecp.h"
#include "mbedtls/ssl_ciphersuites.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#include "mbedtls/x509_crt.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509_crl.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
#include "mbedtls/dhm.h"
#endif
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_ECDH_OR_ECDHE_ANY_ENABLED)
#include "mbedtls/ecdh.h"
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
#endif
#include "psa/crypto.h"
/*
* SSL Error codes
*/
/** A cryptographic operation is in progress. Try again later. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS -0x7000
/** The requested feature is not available. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE -0x7080
/** Bad input parameters to function. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA -0x7100
/** Verification of the message MAC failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC -0x7180
/** An invalid SSL record was received. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD -0x7200
/** The connection indicated an EOF. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONN_EOF -0x7280
/** A message could not be parsed due to a syntactic error. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_DECODE_ERROR -0x7300
/* Error space gap */
/** No RNG was provided to the SSL module. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG -0x7400
/** No client certification received from the client, but required by the authentication mode. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE -0x7480
/** Client received an extended server hello containing an unsupported extension */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION -0x7500
/** No ALPN protocols supported that the client advertises */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL -0x7580
/** The own private key or pre-shared key is not set, but needed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED -0x7600
/** No CA Chain is set, but required to operate. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CA_CHAIN_REQUIRED -0x7680
/** An unexpected message was received from our peer. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE -0x7700
/** A fatal alert message was received from our peer. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FATAL_ALERT_MESSAGE -0x7780
/** No server could be identified matching the client's SNI. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME -0x7800
/** The peer notified us that the connection is going to be closed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY -0x7880
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/** Processing of the Certificate handshake message failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CERTIFICATE -0x7A00
/* Error space gap */
/** A TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket message has been received. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET -0x7B00
/** Not possible to read early data */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA -0x7B80
/**
* Early data has been received as part of an on-going handshake.
* This error code can be returned only on server side if and only if early
* data has been enabled by means of the mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data() API.
* This error code can then be returned by mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() if
* early data has been received as part of the handshake sequence they
* triggered. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data().
*/
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA -0x7C00
/** Not possible to write early data */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA -0x7C80
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/** Cache entry not found */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CACHE_ENTRY_NOT_FOUND -0x7E80
/** Memory allocation failed */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED -0x7F00
/** Hardware acceleration function returned with error */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED -0x7F80
/** Hardware acceleration function skipped / left alone data */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH -0x6F80
/** Handshake protocol not within min/max boundaries */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION -0x6E80
/** The handshake negotiation failed. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE -0x6E00
/** Session ticket has expired. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED -0x6D80
/** Public key type mismatch (eg, asked for RSA key exchange and presented EC key) */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH -0x6D00
/** Unknown identity received (eg, PSK identity) */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY -0x6C80
/** Internal error (eg, unexpected failure in lower-level module) */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR -0x6C00
/** A counter would wrap (eg, too many messages exchanged). */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_COUNTER_WRAPPING -0x6B80
/** Unexpected message at ServerHello in renegotiation. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO -0x6B00
/** DTLS client must retry for hello verification */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED -0x6A80
/** A buffer is too small to receive or write a message */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL -0x6A00
/* Error space gap */
/** No data of requested type currently available on underlying transport. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ -0x6900
/** Connection requires a write call. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE -0x6880
/** The operation timed out. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT -0x6800
/** The client initiated a reconnect from the same port. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT -0x6780
/** Record header looks valid but is not expected. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD -0x6700
/** The alert message received indicates a non-fatal error. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NON_FATAL -0x6680
/** A field in a message was incorrect or inconsistent with other fields. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER -0x6600
/** Internal-only message signaling that further message-processing should be done */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CONTINUE_PROCESSING -0x6580
/** The asynchronous operation is not completed yet. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS -0x6500
/** Internal-only message signaling that a message arrived early. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_EARLY_MESSAGE -0x6480
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/* Error space gap */
/** An encrypted DTLS-frame with an unexpected CID was received. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID -0x6000
/** An operation failed due to an unexpected version or configuration. */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH -0x5F00
/** Invalid value in SSL config */
#define MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG -0x5E80
/*
* Constants from RFC 8446 for TLS 1.3 PSK modes
*
* Those are used in the Pre-Shared Key Exchange Modes extension.
* See Section 4.2.9 in RFC 8446.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_PURE 0 /* Pure PSK-based exchange */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_PSK_MODE_ECDHE 1 /* PSK+ECDHE-based exchange */
/*
* TLS 1.3 NamedGroup values
*
* From RF 8446
* enum {
* // Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE)
* secp256r1(0x0017), secp384r1(0x0018), secp521r1(0x0019),
* x25519(0x001D), x448(0x001E),
* // Finite Field Groups (DHE)
* ffdhe2048(0x0100), ffdhe3072(0x0101), ffdhe4096(0x0102),
* ffdhe6144(0x0103), ffdhe8192(0x0104),
* // Reserved Code Points
* ffdhe_private_use(0x01FC..0x01FF),
* ecdhe_private_use(0xFE00..0xFEFF),
* (0xFFFF)
* } NamedGroup;
*
*/
/* Elliptic Curve Groups (ECDHE) */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_NONE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192K1 0x0012
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP192R1 0x0013
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224K1 0x0014
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP224R1 0x0015
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256K1 0x0016
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP256R1 0x0017
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP384R1 0x0018
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_SECP521R1 0x0019
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP256R1 0x001A
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP384R1 0x001B
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_BP512R1 0x001C
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X25519 0x001D
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_X448 0x001E
/* Finite Field Groups (DHE) */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE2048 0x0100
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE3072 0x0101
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE4096 0x0102
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE6144 0x0103
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IANA_TLS_GROUP_FFDHE8192 0x0104
/*
* TLS 1.3 Key Exchange Modes
*
* Mbed TLS internal identifiers for use with the SSL configuration API
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes().
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK (1u << 0) /*!< Pure-PSK TLS 1.3 key exchange,
* encompassing both externally agreed PSKs
* as well as resumption PSKs. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL (1u << 1) /*!< Pure-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
* including for example ECDHE and DHE
* key exchanges. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL (1u << 2) /*!< PSK-Ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges,
* using both a PSK and an ephemeral
* key exchange. */
/* Convenience macros for sets of key exchanges. */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All PSK-based TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL) /*!< All ephemeral TLS 1.3 key exchanges */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_NONE (0)
/*
* Various constants
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/* These are the high and low bytes of ProtocolVersion as defined by:
* - RFC 5246: ProtocolVersion version = { 3, 3 }; // TLS v1.2
* - RFC 8446: see section 4.2.1
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 3 /*!< TLS v1.2 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 4 /*!< TLS v1.3 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM 0 /*!< TLS */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM 1 /*!< DTLS */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum host name defined in RFC 1035 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_NAME_LEN 255 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of a protocol name in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_ALPN_LIST_LEN 65535 /*!< Maximum size in bytes of list in alpn ext., RFC 7301 */
/* RFC 6066 section 4, see also mfl_code_to_length in ssl_tls.c
* NONE must be zero so that memset()ing structure to zero works */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE 0 /*!< don't use this extension */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512 1 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^9 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024 2 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^10 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048 3 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^11 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096 4 /*!< MaxFragmentLength 2^12 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID 5 /*!< first invalid value */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET 3 /* Used only for sni_authmode */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED -1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGO_MAX_RECORDS_DEFAULT 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC_LEN 10 /* 80 bits, rfc 6066 section 7 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_DEFAULT 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_SUITEB 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER 0
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_384)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 48
#elif defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_SHA_256)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN 32
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
/*
* Default range for DTLS retransmission timer value, in milliseconds.
* RFC 6347 4.2.4.1 says from 1 second to 60 seconds.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MIN 1000
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_TIMEOUT_DFL_MAX 60000
/*
* Whether early data record should be discarded or not and how.
*
* The client has indicated early data and the server has rejected them.
* The server has then to skip past early data by either:
* - attempting to deprotect received records using the handshake traffic
* key, discarding records which fail deprotection (up to the configured
* max_early_data_size). Once a record is deprotected successfully,
* it is treated as the start of the client's second flight and the
* server proceeds as with an ordinary 1-RTT handshake.
* - skipping all records with an external content type of
* "application_data" (indicating that they are encrypted), up to the
* configured max_early_data_size. This is the expected behavior if the
* server has sent an HelloRetryRequest message. The server ignores
* application data message before 2nd ClientHello.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD 2
/**
* \name SECTION: Module settings
*
* The configuration options you can set for this module are in this section.
* Either change them in mbedtls_config.h or define them on the compiler command line.
* \{
*/
/*
* Maximum fragment length in bytes,
* determines the size of each of the two internal I/O buffers.
*
* Note: the RFC defines the default size of SSL / TLS messages. If you
* change the value here, other clients / servers may not be able to
* communicate with you anymore. Only change this value if you control
* both sides of the connection and have it reduced at both sides, or
* if you're using the Max Fragment Length extension and you know all your
* peers are using it too!
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN 16384
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN 16384
#endif
/*
* Maximum number of heap-allocated bytes for the purpose of
* DTLS handshake message reassembly and future message buffering.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_MAX_BUFFERING 32768
#endif
/*
* Maximum length of CIDs for incoming and outgoing messages.
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX 32
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX 32
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_TLS1_3_PADDING_GRANULARITY 16
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE 1024
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_AGE_TOLERANCE 6000
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_NONCE_LENGTH 32
#endif
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS 1
#endif
/** \} name SECTION: Module settings */
/*
* Default to standard CID mode
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT 0
#endif
/*
* Length of the verify data for secure renegotiation
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN 12
/*
* Signaling ciphersuite values (SCSV)
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF /**< renegotiation info ext */
/*
* Supported Signature and Hash algorithms (For TLS 1.2)
* RFC 5246 section 7.4.1.4.1
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_NONE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_MD5 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA1 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA224 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256 4
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384 5
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA512 6
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ANON 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA 3
/*
* TLS 1.3 signature algorithms
* RFC 8446, Section 4.2.3
*/
/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithms */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 0x0401
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA384 0x0501
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA512 0x0601
/* ECDSA algorithms */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP256R1_SHA256 0x0403
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP384R1_SHA384 0x0503
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SECP521R1_SHA512 0x0603
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID rsaEncryption */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA256 0x0804
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA384 0x0805
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_RSAE_SHA512 0x0806
/* EdDSA algorithms */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED25519 0x0807
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ED448 0x0808
/* RSASSA-PSS algorithms with public key OID RSASSA-PSS */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA256 0x0809
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA384 0x080A
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PSS_PSS_SHA512 0x080B
/* LEGACY ALGORITHMS */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA1 0x0201
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_ECDSA_SHA1 0x0203
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE 0x0
/*
* Client Certificate Types
* RFC 5246 section 7.4.4 plus RFC 4492 section 5.5
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN 64
/*
* Message, alert and handshake types
*/
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 20
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_ALERT 21
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE 22
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_APPLICATION_DATA 23
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_CID 25
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CLOSE_NOTIFY 0 /* 0x00 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 10 /* 0x0A */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_RECORD_MAC 20 /* 0x14 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPTION_FAILED 21 /* 0x15 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_RECORD_OVERFLOW 22 /* 0x16 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 30 /* 0x1E */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 40 /* 0x28 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_CERT 41 /* 0x29 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_BAD_CERT 42 /* 0x2A */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_CERT 43 /* 0x2B */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REVOKED 44 /* 0x2C */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_EXPIRED 45 /* 0x2D */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_UNKNOWN 46 /* 0x2E */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 47 /* 0x2F */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_CA 48 /* 0x30 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ACCESS_DENIED 49 /* 0x31 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR 50 /* 0x32 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR 51 /* 0x33 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 60 /* 0x3C */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION 70 /* 0x46 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 71 /* 0x47 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR 80 /* 0x50 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 86 /* 0x56 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_USER_CANCELED 90 /* 0x5A */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_RENEGOTIATION 100 /* 0x64 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_MISSING_EXTENSION 109 /* 0x6d -- new in TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT 110 /* 0x6E */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 112 /* 0x70 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY 115 /* 0x73 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_CERT_REQUIRED 116 /* 0x74 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL 120 /* 0x78 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_REQUEST 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO 1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO 2
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 3
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 4
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_END_OF_EARLY_DATA 5
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS 8
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE 11
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 12
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 13
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE 14
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY 15
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 16
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_FINISHED 20
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_MESSAGE_HASH 254
/*
* TLS extensions
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME 0
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME 0
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH 1
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC 4
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_STATUS_REQUEST 5 /* RFC 6066 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES 10
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_GROUPS 10 /* RFC 8422,7919 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS 11
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG 13 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP 14
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT 15 /* RFC 6520 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN 16
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SCT 18 /* RFC 6962 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CLI_CERT_TYPE 19 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERV_CERT_TYPE 20 /* RFC 7250 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PADDING 21 /* RFC 7685 TLS 1.2 and 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC 22 /* 0x16 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET 0x0017 /* 23 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT 28 /* RFC 8449 (implemented for TLS 1.3 only) */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET 35
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PRE_SHARED_KEY 41 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EARLY_DATA 42 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS 43 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_COOKIE 44 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_PSK_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODES 45 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CERT_AUTH 47 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_OID_FILTERS 48 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH 49 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG_CERT 50 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_KEY_SHARE 51 /* RFC 8446 TLS 1.3 */
#if MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID_COMPAT == 0
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 54 /* RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID 254 /* Pre-RFC 9146 DTLS 1.2 CID */
#endif
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP 256 /* experimental */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO 0xFF01
/*
* Size defines
*/
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN)
/*
* If the library supports TLS 1.3 tickets and the cipher suite
* TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384, set the PSK maximum length to 48 instead of 32.
* That way, the TLS 1.3 client and server are able to resume sessions where
* the cipher suite is TLS1-3-AES-256-GCM-SHA384 (pre-shared keys are 48
* bytes long in that case).
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_AES) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HAVE_GCM) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 48 /* 384 bits */
#else
#define MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN 32 /* 256 bits */
#endif
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN */
/* Dummy type used only for its size */
union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret {
unsigned char dummy; /* Make the union non-empty even with SSL disabled */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_rsa[48]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.1 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_dhm[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; /* RFC 5246 8.1.2 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_ecdh[MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES]; /* RFC 4492 5.10 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_psk[4 + 2 * MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 2 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_dhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE
+ MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 3 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_rsa_psk[52 + MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 4279 4 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_ecdhe_psk[4 + MBEDTLS_ECP_MAX_BYTES
+ MBEDTLS_PSK_MAX_LEN]; /* RFC 5489 2 */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
unsigned char _pms_ecjpake[32]; /* Thread spec: SHA-256 output */
#endif
};
#define MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE sizeof(union mbedtls_ssl_premaster_secret)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE
/* Length in number of bytes of the TLS sequence number */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN 8
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif
/*
* SSL state machine
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP,
MBEDTLS_SSL_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS,
MBEDTLS_SSL_END_OF_EARLY_DATA,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_FINISHED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_BEFORE_2ND_CLIENT_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_SERVER_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CCS_AFTER_CLIENT_HELLO,
MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CCS_AFTER_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET_FLUSH,
}
mbedtls_ssl_states;
/*
* Early data status, client side only.
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
typedef enum {
/*
* See documentation of mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status().
*/
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED,
MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED,
} mbedtls_ssl_early_data_status;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/**
* \brief Callback type: send data on the network.
*
* \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
*
* \param ctx Context for the send callback (typically a file descriptor)
* \param buf Buffer holding the data to send
* \param len Length of the data to send
*
* \return The callback must return the number of bytes sent if any,
* or a non-zero error code.
* If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* must be returned when the operation would block.
*
* \note The callback is allowed to send fewer bytes than requested.
* It must always return the number of bytes actually sent.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_send_t(void *ctx,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len);
/**
* \brief Callback type: receive data from the network.
*
* \note That callback may be either blocking or non-blocking.
*
* \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file
* descriptor)
* \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
* \param len Length of the receive buffer
*
* \returns If data has been received, the positive number of bytes received.
* \returns \c 0 if the connection has been closed.
* \returns If performing non-blocking I/O, \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ
* must be returned when the operation would block.
* \returns Another negative error code on other kinds of failures.
*
* \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
* buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
* received and written to the buffer.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_t(void *ctx,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len);
/**
* \brief Callback type: receive data from the network, with timeout
*
* \note That callback must block until data is received, or the
* timeout delay expires, or the operation is interrupted by a
* signal.
*
* \param ctx Context for the receive callback (typically a file descriptor)
* \param buf Buffer to write the received data to
* \param len Length of the receive buffer
* \param timeout Maximum number of milliseconds to wait for data
* 0 means no timeout (potentially waiting forever)
*
* \return The callback must return the number of bytes received,
* or a non-zero error code:
* \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_TIMEOUT if the operation timed out,
* \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ if interrupted by a signal.
*
* \note The callback may receive fewer bytes than the length of the
* buffer. It must always return the number of bytes actually
* received and written to the buffer.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t(void *ctx,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len,
uint32_t timeout);
/**
* \brief Callback type: set a pair of timers/delays to watch
*
* \param ctx Context pointer
* \param int_ms Intermediate delay in milliseconds
* \param fin_ms Final delay in milliseconds
* 0 cancels the current timer.
*
* \note This callback must at least store the necessary information
* for the associated \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t callback to
* return correct information.
*
* \note If using an event-driven style of programming, an event must
* be generated when the final delay is passed. The event must
* cause a call to \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the proper
* SSL context to be scheduled. Care must be taken to ensure
* that at most one such call happens at a time.
*
* \note Only one timer at a time must be running. Calling this
* function while a timer is running must cancel it. Cancelled
* timers must not generate any event.
*/
typedef void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t(void *ctx,
uint32_t int_ms,
uint32_t fin_ms);
/**
* \brief Callback type: get status of timers/delays
*
* \param ctx Context pointer
*
* \return This callback must return:
* -1 if cancelled (fin_ms == 0),
* 0 if none of the delays have passed,
* 1 if only the intermediate delay has passed,
* 2 if the final delay has passed.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t(void *ctx);
/* Defined below */
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_session mbedtls_ssl_session;
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_context mbedtls_ssl_context;
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_config mbedtls_ssl_config;
/* Defined in library/ssl_misc.h */
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_transform mbedtls_ssl_transform;
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params;
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t mbedtls_ssl_sig_hash_set_t;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_key_cert mbedtls_ssl_key_cert;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
typedef struct mbedtls_ssl_flight_item mbedtls_ssl_flight_item;
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK /* 1U << 0 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL /* 1U << 2 */
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA (1U << 3)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_FLAGS_MASK \
(MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_RESUMPTION | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_PSK_EPHEMERAL_RESUMPTION | \
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_ALLOW_EARLY_DATA)
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
/**
* \brief Callback type: server-side session cache getter
*
* The session cache is logically a key value store, with
* keys being session IDs and values being instances of
* mbedtls_ssl_session.
*
* This callback retrieves an entry in this key-value store.
*
* \param data The address of the session cache structure to query.
* \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
* \param session The address of the session structure to populate.
* It is initialized with mbdtls_ssl_session_init(),
* and the callback must always leave it in a state
* where it can safely be freed via
* mbedtls_ssl_session_free() independent of the
* return code of this function.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return A non-zero return value on failure.
*
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t(void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
/**
* \brief Callback type: server-side session cache setter
*
* The session cache is logically a key value store, with
* keys being session IDs and values being instances of
* mbedtls_ssl_session.
*
* This callback sets an entry in this key-value store.
*
* \param data The address of the session cache structure to modify.
* \param session_id The buffer holding the session ID to query.
* \param session_id_len The length of \p session_id in Bytes.
* \param session The address of the session to be stored in the
* session cache.
*
* \return \c 0 on success
* \return A non-zero return value on failure.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t(void *data,
unsigned char const *session_id,
size_t session_id_len,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Callback type: start external signature operation.
*
* This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
* a signature decryption operation using an
* external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
* the public key; it is up to the callback function to
* determine how to access the associated private key.
*
* This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
* does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
* the handshake step to be non-blocking.
*
* The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
* valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
* function must save the contents of \p hash if the value
* is needed for later processing, because the \p hash buffer
* is no longer valid after this function returns.
*
* This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
* to store an operation context for later retrieval
* by the resume or cancel callback.
*
* \note For RSA signatures, this function must produce output
* that is consistent with PKCS#1 v1.5 in the same way as
* mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign(). Before the private key operation,
* apply the padding steps described in RFC 8017, section 9.2
* "EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5" as follows.
* - If \p md_alg is #MBEDTLS_MD_NONE, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
* encoding, treating \p hash as the DigestInfo to be
* padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
* from step 3, with `T = hash` and `tLen = hash_len`.
* - If `md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE`, apply the PKCS#1 v1.5
* encoding, treating \p hash as the hash to be encoded and
* padded. In other words, apply EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5 starting
* from step 2, with `digestAlgorithm` obtained by calling
* mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md() on \p md_alg.
*
* \note For ECDSA signatures, the output format is the DER encoding
* `Ecdsa-Sig-Value` defined in
* [RFC 4492 section 5.4](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492#section-5.4).
*
* \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
* modified other than via
* mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
* \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
* In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
* connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
* property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
* is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
* this callback determines what certificate is used.
* \param md_alg Hash algorithm.
* \param hash Buffer containing the hash. This buffer is
* no longer valid when the function returns.
* \param hash_len Size of the \c hash buffer in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
* stack should call the resume callback immediately.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
* was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
* immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
* processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
* use the private key object instead.
* \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
* propagated up the call chain. The callback should
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
* directed in the documentation of this callback.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg,
const unsigned char *hash,
size_t hash_len);
/**
* \brief Callback type: start external decryption operation.
*
* This callback is called during an SSL handshake to start
* an RSA decryption operation using an
* external processor. The parameter \p cert contains
* the public key; it is up to the callback function to
* determine how to access the associated private key.
*
* This function typically sends or enqueues a request, and
* does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
* the handshake step to be non-blocking.
*
* The parameters \p ssl and \p cert are guaranteed to remain
* valid throughout the handshake. On the other hand, this
* function must save the contents of \p input if the value
* is needed for later processing, because the \p input buffer
* is no longer valid after this function returns.
*
* This function may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data()
* to store an operation context for later retrieval
* by the resume or cancel callback.
*
* \warning RSA decryption as used in TLS is subject to a potential
* timing side channel attack first discovered by Bleichenbacher
* in 1998. This attack can be remotely exploitable
* in practice. To avoid this attack, you must ensure that
* if the callback performs an RSA decryption, the time it
* takes to execute and return the result does not depend
* on whether the RSA decryption succeeded or reported
* invalid padding.
*
* \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
* modified other than via
* mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
* \param cert Certificate containing the public key.
* In simple cases, this is one of the pointers passed to
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() when configuring the SSL
* connection. However, if other callbacks are used, this
* property may not hold. For example, if an SNI callback
* is registered with mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(), then
* this callback determines what certificate is used.
* \param input Buffer containing the input ciphertext. This buffer
* is no longer valid when the function returns.
* \param input_len Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if the operation was started successfully and the SSL
* stack should call the resume callback immediately.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
* was started successfully and the SSL stack should return
* immediately without calling the resume callback yet.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FALLTHROUGH if the external
* processor does not support this key. The SSL stack will
* use the private key object instead.
* \return Any other error indicates a fatal failure and is
* propagated up the call chain. The callback should
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
* directed in the documentation of this callback.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *cert,
const unsigned char *input,
size_t input_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/**
* \brief Callback type: resume external operation.
*
* This callback is called during an SSL handshake to resume
* an external operation started by the
* ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t or
* ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t callback.
*
* This function typically checks the status of a pending
* request or causes the request queue to make progress, and
* does not wait for the operation to complete. This allows
* the handshake step to be non-blocking.
*
* This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
* to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
* It may call mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() to modify
* this context.
*
* Note that when this function returns a status other than
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, it must free any
* resources associated with the operation.
*
* \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
* modified other than via
* mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data().
* \param output Buffer containing the output (signature or decrypted
* data) on success.
* \param output_len On success, number of bytes written to \p output.
* \param output_size Size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
*
* \return 0 if output of the operation is available in the
* \p output buffer.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if the operation
* is still in progress. Subsequent requests for progress
* on the SSL connection will call the resume callback
* again.
* \return Any other error means that the operation is aborted.
* The SSL handshake is aborted. The callback should
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_PK_xxx error codes, and must not
* use \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_xxx error codes except as
* directed in the documentation of this callback.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *output,
size_t *output_len,
size_t output_size);
/**
* \brief Callback type: cancel external operation.
*
* This callback is called if an SSL connection is closed
* while an asynchronous operation is in progress. Note that
* this callback is not called if the
* ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t callback has run and has
* returned a value other than
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS, since in that case
* the asynchronous operation has already completed.
*
* This function may call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data()
* to retrieve an operation context set by the start callback.
*
* \param ssl The SSL connection instance. It should not be
* modified.
*/
typedef void mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED) && \
!defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_MAX_LEN 48
#if defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA256)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 32
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA384)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 48
#elif defined(MBEDTLS_MD_CAN_SHA1)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_TYPE MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_PEER_CERT_DIGEST_DFL_LEN 20
#else
/* This is already checked in check_config.h, but be sure. */
#error "Bad configuration - need SHA-1, SHA-256 or SHA-512 enabled to compute digest of peer CRT."
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED &&
!MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
typedef struct {
unsigned char client_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char server_application_traffic_secret_N[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char exporter_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
unsigned char resumption_master_secret[MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_MD_MAX_SIZE];
} mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets;
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH 255
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH 4
/*
* For code readability use a typedef for DTLS-SRTP profiles
*
* Use_srtp extension protection profiles values as defined in
* http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
*
* Reminder: if this list is expanded mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
* must be updated too.
*/
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0001)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0002)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80 ((uint16_t) 0x0005)
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32 ((uint16_t) 0x0006)
/* This one is not iana defined, but for code readability. */
#define MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET ((uint16_t) 0x0000)
typedef uint16_t mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile;
typedef struct mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info_t {
/*! The SRTP profile that was negotiated. */
mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(chosen_dtls_srtp_profile);
/*! The length of mki_value. */
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_len);
/*! The mki_value used, with max size of 256 bytes. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mki_value)[MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_MKI_LENGTH];
}
mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info;
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
/** Human-friendly representation of the (D)TLS protocol version. */
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN, /*!< Context not in use or version not yet negotiated. */
MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_2 = 0x0303, /*!< (D)TLS 1.2 */
MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_TLS1_3 = 0x0304, /*!< (D)TLS 1.3 */
} mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version;
/*
* This structure is used for storing current session data.
*
* Note: when changing this definition, we need to check and update:
* - in tests/suites/test_suite_ssl.function:
* ssl_populate_session() and ssl_serialize_session_save_load()
* - in library/ssl_tls.c:
* mbedtls_ssl_session_init() and mbedtls_ssl_session_free()
* mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and ssl_session_load()
* ssl_session_copy()
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_session {
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< MaxFragmentLength negotiated by peer */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
/*!< RecordSizeLimit received from the peer */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(record_size_limit);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RECORD_SIZE_LIMIT */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(exported);
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
/** TLS version negotiated in the session. Used if and when renegotiating
* or resuming a session instead of the configured minor TLS version.
*/
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
mbedtls_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(start); /*!< start time of current session */
#endif
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite); /*!< chosen ciphersuite */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len); /*!< session id length */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id)[32]; /*!< session identifier */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(master)[48]; /*!< the master secret */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert); /*!< peer X.509 cert chain */
#else /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
/*! The digest of the peer's end-CRT. This must be kept to detect CRT
* changes during renegotiation, mitigating the triple handshake attack. */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest);
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_len);
mbedtls_md_type_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_cert_digest_type);
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_result); /*!< verification result */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket); /*!< RFC 5077 session ticket */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_len); /*!< session ticket length */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_lifetime); /*!< ticket lifetime hint */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/*! When a ticket is created by a TLS server as part of an established TLS
* session, the ticket creation time may need to be saved for the ticket
* module to be able to check the ticket age when the ticket is used.
* That's the purpose of this field.
* Before creating a new ticket, an Mbed TLS server set this field with
* its current time in milliseconds. This time may then be saved in the
* session ticket data by the session ticket writing function and
* recovered by the ticket parsing function later when the ticket is used.
* The ticket module may then use this time to compute the ticket age and
* determine if it has expired or not.
* The Mbed TLS implementations of the session ticket writing and parsing
* functions save and retrieve the ticket creation time as part of the
* session ticket data. The session ticket parsing function relies on
* the mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time() API to get the
* ticket creation time from the session ticket data.
*/
mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_age_add); /*!< Randomly generated value used to obscure the age of the ticket */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_flags); /*!< Ticket flags */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key_len); /*!< resumption_key length */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(resumption_key)[MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_TICKET_RESUMPTION_KEY_LEN];
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< host name binded with tickets */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
char *ticket_alpn; /*!< ALPN negotiated in the session
during which the ticket was generated. */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/*! Time in milliseconds when the last ticket was received. */
mbedtls_ms_time_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_reception_time);
#endif
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 && MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size); /*!< maximum amount of early data in tickets */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< flag for EtM activation */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
mbedtls_ssl_tls13_application_secrets MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(app_secrets);
#endif
};
/*
* Identifiers for PRFs used in various versions of TLS.
*/
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA384,
MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_SHA256,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA384,
MBEDTLS_SSL_HKDF_EXPAND_SHA256
}
mbedtls_tls_prf_types;
typedef enum {
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS12_MASTER_SECRET = 0,
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_EARLY_SECRET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_CLIENT_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
MBEDTLS_SSL_KEY_EXPORT_TLS1_3_SERVER_APPLICATION_TRAFFIC_SECRET,
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
} mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type;
/**
* \brief Callback type: Export key alongside random values for
* session identification, and PRF for
* implementation of TLS key exporters.
*
* \param p_expkey Context for the callback.
* \param type The type of the key that is being exported.
* \param secret The address of the buffer holding the secret
* that's being exporterd.
* \param secret_len The length of \p secret in bytes.
* \param client_random The client random bytes.
* \param server_random The server random bytes.
* \param tls_prf_type The identifier for the PRF used in the handshake
* to which the key belongs.
*/
typedef void mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t(void *p_expkey,
mbedtls_ssl_key_export_type type,
const unsigned char *secret,
size_t secret_len,
const unsigned char client_random[32],
const unsigned char server_random[32],
mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Callback type: generic handshake callback
*
* \note Callbacks may use user_data funcs to set/get app user data.
* See \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p()
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n()
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p()
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n()
*
* \param ssl \c mbedtls_ssl_context on which the callback is run
*
* \return The return value of the callback is 0 if successful,
* or a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code, which will cause
* the handshake to be aborted.
*/
typedef int (*mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t)(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif
/* A type for storing user data in a library structure.
*
* The representation of type may change in future versions of the library.
* Only the behaviors guaranteed by documented accessor functions are
* guaranteed to remain stable.
*/
typedef union {
uintptr_t n; /* typically a handle to an associated object */
void *p; /* typically a pointer to extra data */
} mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t;
/**
* SSL/TLS configuration to be shared between mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
*/
struct mbedtls_ssl_config {
/* Group items mostly by size. This helps to reduce memory wasted to
* padding. It also helps to keep smaller fields early in the structure,
* so that elements tend to be in the 128-element direct access window
* on Arm Thumb, which reduces the code size. */
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version); /*!< max. TLS version used */
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version); /*!< min. TLS version used */
/*
* Flags (could be bit-fields to save RAM, but separate bytes make
* the code smaller on architectures with an instruction for direct
* byte access).
*/
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint); /*!< 0: client, 1: server */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transport); /*!< 0: stream (TLS), 1: datagram (DTLS) */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(authmode); /*!< MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_XXX */
/* needed even with renego disabled for LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(allow_legacy_renegotiation); /*!< MBEDTLS_LEGACY_XXX */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mfl_code); /*!< desired fragment length indicator
(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_XXX) */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(encrypt_then_mac); /*!< negotiate encrypt-then-mac? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(extended_ms); /*!< negotiate extended master secret? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(anti_replay); /*!< detect and prevent replay? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_renegotiation); /*!< disable renegotiation? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/** Encodes two booleans, one stating whether TLS 1.2 session tickets are
* enabled or not, the other one whether the handling of TLS 1.3
* NewSessionTicket messages is enabled or not. They are respectively set
* by mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets() and
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
*/
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_tickets); /*!< use session tickets? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(new_session_tickets_count); /*!< number of NewSessionTicket */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_req_ca_list); /*!< enable sending CA list in
Certificate Request messages? */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(respect_cli_pref); /*!< pick the ciphersuite according to
the client's preferences rather
than ours? */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ignore_unexpected_cid); /*!< Should DTLS record with
* unexpected CID
* lead to failure? */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_mki_support); /* support having mki_value
in the use_srtp extension? */
#endif
/*
* Pointers
*/
/** Allowed ciphersuites for (D)TLS 1.2 (0-terminated) */
const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite_list);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/** Allowed TLS 1.3 key exchange modes. */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls13_kex_modes);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
/** Callback for printing debug output */
void(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_dbg))(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_dbg); /*!< context for the debug function */
/** Callback for getting (pseudo-)random numbers */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_rng))(void *, unsigned char *, size_t);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_rng); /*!< context for the RNG function */
/** Callback to retrieve a session from the cache */
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_cache);
/** Callback to store a session into the cache */
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_cache);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cache); /*!< context for cache callbacks */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
/** Callback for setting cert according to SNI extension */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_sni))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_sni); /*!< context for SNI callback */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify calllback */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/** Callback to retrieve PSK key from identity */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_psk))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *, size_t);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_psk); /*!< context for PSK callback */
#endif
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/** Callback to create & write a cookie for ClientHello verification */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_write))(void *, unsigned char **, unsigned char *,
const unsigned char *, size_t);
/** Callback to verify validity of a ClientHello cookie */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cookie_check))(void *, const unsigned char *, size_t,
const unsigned char *, size_t);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_cookie); /*!< context for the cookie callbacks */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/** Callback to create & write a session ticket */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_write))(void *, const mbedtls_ssl_session *,
unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, size_t *,
uint32_t *);
/** Callback to parse a session ticket into a session structure */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ticket_parse))(void *, mbedtls_ssl_session *, unsigned char *, size_t);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ticket); /*!< context for the ticket callbacks */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cid_len); /*!< The length of CIDs for incoming DTLS records. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cert_profile); /*!< verification profile */
mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_cert); /*!< own certificate/key pair(s) */
mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_chain); /*!< trusted CAs */
mbedtls_x509_crl *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ca_crl); /*!< trusted CAs CRLs */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_ca_cb);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_ca_cb);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_sign_start); /*!< start asynchronous signature operation */
mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_decrypt_start); /*!< start asynchronous decryption operation */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_resume); /*!< resume asynchronous operation */
mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_async_cancel); /*!< cancel asynchronous operation */
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_async_config_data); /*!< Configuration data set by mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(). */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
const int *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_hashes); /*!< allowed signature hashes */
#endif
const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(sig_algs); /*!< allowed signature algorithms */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) && !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(curve_list); /*!< allowed curves */
#endif
const uint16_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(group_list); /*!< allowed IANA NamedGroups */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C)
mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_P); /*!< prime modulus for DHM */
mbedtls_mpi MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_G); /*!< generator for DHM */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_opaque); /*!< PSA key slot holding opaque PSK. This field
* should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If either no PSK or a raw PSK have been
* configured, this has value \c 0.
*/
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk); /*!< The raw pre-shared key. This field should
* only be set via mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* If either no PSK or an opaque PSK
* have been configured, this has value NULL. */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_len); /*!< The length of the raw pre-shared key.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL. */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity); /*!< The PSK identity for PSK negotiation.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* This is set if and only if either
* \c psk or \c psk_opaque are set. */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(psk_identity_len);/*!< The length of PSK identity.
* This field should only be set via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
* Its value is non-zero if and only if
* \c psk is not \c NULL or \c psk_opaque
* is not \c 0. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_enabled); /*!< Early data enablement:
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED,
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data. RFC 8446 section 4.6.1 */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_early_data_size);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char **MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_list); /*!< ordered list of protocols */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
/*! ordered list of supported srtp profile */
const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list);
/*! number of supported profiles */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_profile_list_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
/*
* Numerical settings (int)
*/
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(read_timeout); /*!< timeout for mbedtls_ssl_read (ms) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_min); /*!< initial value of the handshake
retransmission timeout (ms) */
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hs_timeout_max); /*!< maximum value of the handshake
retransmission timeout (ms) */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_max_records); /*!< grace period for renegotiation */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_period)[8]; /*!< value of the record counters
that triggers renegotiation */
#endif
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_limit); /*!< limit of records with a bad MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dhm_min_bitlen); /*!< min. bit length of the DHM prime */
#endif
/** User data pointer or handle.
*
* The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
* access it afterwards.
*/
mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb); /*!< certificate selection callback */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
const mbedtls_x509_crt *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints);/*!< acceptable client cert issuers */
#endif
};
struct mbedtls_ssl_context {
const mbedtls_ssl_config *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf); /*!< configuration information */
/*
* Miscellaneous
*/
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state); /*!< SSL handshake: current state */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_status); /*!< Initial, in progress, pending? */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(renego_records_seen); /*!< Records since renego request, or with DTLS,
number of retransmissions of request if
renego_max_records is < 0 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/**
* Maximum TLS version to be negotiated, then negotiated TLS version.
*
* It is initialized as the configured maximum TLS version to be
* negotiated by mbedtls_ssl_setup().
*
* When renegotiating or resuming a session, it is overwritten in the
* ClientHello writing preparation stage with the previously negotiated
* TLS version.
*
* On client side, it is updated to the TLS version selected by the server
* for the handshake when the ServerHello is received.
*
* On server side, it is updated to the TLS version the server selects for
* the handshake when the ClientHello is received.
*/
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* State of the negotiation and transfer of early data. Reset to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE_IDLE when the context is reset.
*/
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(early_data_state);
#endif
unsigned MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(badmac_seen); /*!< records with a bad MAC received */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/** Callback to customize X.509 certificate chain verification */
int(*MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_vrfy))(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_vrfy); /*!< context for X.509 verify callback */
#endif
mbedtls_ssl_send_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_send); /*!< Callback for network send */
mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv); /*!< Callback for network receive */
mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_recv_timeout);
/*!< Callback for network receive with timeout */
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_bio); /*!< context for I/O operations */
/*
* Session layer
*/
mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_in); /*!< current session data (in) */
mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_out); /*!< current session data (out) */
mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session); /*!< negotiated session data */
mbedtls_ssl_session *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(session_negotiate); /*!< session data in negotiation */
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(handshake); /*!< params required only during
the handshake process */
/*
* Record layer transformations
*/
mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_in); /*!< current transform params (in)
* This is always a reference,
* never an owning pointer. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_out); /*!< current transform params (out)
* This is always a reference,
* never an owning pointer. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform); /*!< negotiated transform params
* This pointer owns the transform
* it references. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_negotiate); /*!< transform params in negotiation
* This pointer owns the transform
* it references. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/*! The application data transform in TLS 1.3.
* This pointer owns the transform it references. */
mbedtls_ssl_transform *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(transform_application);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
/*
* Timers
*/
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_timer); /*!< context for the timer callbacks */
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_set_timer); /*!< set timer callback */
mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_get_timer); /*!< get timer callback */
/*
* Record layer (incoming data)
*/
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf); /*!< input buffer */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_ctr); /*!< 64-bit incoming message counter
TLS: maintained by us
DTLS: read from peer */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
* (the end is marked by in_len). */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msg); /*!< message contents (in_iv+ivlen) */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_offt); /*!< read offset in application data */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_left); /*!< amount of data read so far */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_buf_len); /*!< length of input buffer */
#endif
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_epoch); /*!< DTLS epoch for incoming records */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(next_record_offset); /*!< offset of the next record in datagram
(equal to in_left if none) */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window_top); /*!< last validated record seq_num */
uint64_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_window); /*!< bitmask for replay detection */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(in_hslen); /*!< current handshake message length,
including the handshake header */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(nb_zero); /*!< # of 0-length encrypted messages */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(keep_current_message); /*!< drop or reuse current message
on next call to record layer? */
/* The following three variables indicate if and, if yes,
* what kind of alert is pending to be sent.
*/
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(send_alert); /*!< Determines if a fatal alert
should be sent. Values:
- \c 0 , no alert is to be sent.
- \c 1 , alert is to be sent. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_type); /*!< Type of alert if send_alert
!= 0 */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alert_reason); /*!< The error code to be returned
to the user once the fatal alert
has been sent. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(disable_datagram_packing); /*!< Disable packing multiple records
* within a single datagram. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/*
* One of:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_DISCARD
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_TRY_TO_DEPROTECT_AND_DISCARD
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISCARD
*/
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(discard_early_data_record);
#endif
uint32_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(total_early_data_size); /*!< Number of received/written early data bytes */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/*
* Record layer (outgoing data)
*/
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf); /*!< output buffer */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_ctr); /*!< 64-bit outgoing message counter */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_hdr); /*!< start of record header */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_cid); /*!< The start of the CID;
* (the end is marked by in_len). */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_len); /*!< two-bytes message length field */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_iv); /*!< ivlen-byte IV */
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msg); /*!< message contents (out_iv+ivlen) */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msgtype); /*!< record header: message type */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_msglen); /*!< record header: message length */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_left); /*!< amount of data not yet written */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_VARIABLE_BUFFER_LENGTH)
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(out_buf_len); /*!< length of output buffer */
#endif
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cur_out_ctr)[MBEDTLS_SSL_SEQUENCE_NUMBER_LEN]; /*!< Outgoing record sequence number. */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
uint16_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(mtu); /*!< path mtu, used to fragment outgoing messages */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
/*
* User settings
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname); /*!< expected peer CN for verification
(and SNI if available) */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
const char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alpn_chosen); /*!< negotiated protocol */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
/*
* use_srtp extension
*/
mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dtls_srtp_info);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
/*
* Information for DTLS hello verify
*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
unsigned char *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id); /*!< transport-level ID of the client */
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cli_id_len); /*!< length of cli_id */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/*
* Secure renegotiation
*/
/* needed to know when to send extension on server */
int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(secure_renegotiation); /*!< does peer support legacy or
secure renegotiation */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(verify_data_len); /*!< length of verify data stored */
char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_verify_data)[MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_DATA_MAX_LEN]; /*!< previous handshake verify data */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/* CID configuration to use in subsequent handshakes. */
/*! The next incoming CID, chosen by the user and applying to
* all subsequent handshakes. This may be different from the
* CID currently used in case the user has re-configured the CID
* after an initial handshake. */
unsigned char MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid)[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX];
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(own_cid_len); /*!< The length of \c own_cid. */
uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(negotiate_cid); /*!< This indicates whether the CID extension should
* be negotiated in the next handshake or not.
* Possible values are #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED
* and #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED. */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/** Callback to export key block and master secret */
mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_export_keys);
void *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(p_export_keys); /*!< context for key export callback */
/** User data pointer or handle.
*
* The library sets this to \p 0 when creating a context and does not
* access it afterwards.
*
* \warning Serializing and restoring an SSL context with
* mbedtls_ssl_context_save() and mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
* does not currently restore the user data.
*/
mbedtls_ssl_user_data_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data);
};
/**
* \brief Return the name of the ciphersuite associated with the
* given ID
*
* \param ciphersuite_id SSL ciphersuite ID
*
* \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name(const int ciphersuite_id);
/**
* \brief Return the ID of the ciphersuite associated with the
* given name
*
* \param ciphersuite_name SSL ciphersuite name
*
* \return the ID with the ciphersuite or 0 if not found
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id(const char *ciphersuite_name);
/**
* \brief Initialize an SSL context
* Just makes the context ready for mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
* mbedtls_ssl_free()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_init(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Set up an SSL context for use
*
* \note No copy of the configuration context is made, it can be
* shared by many mbedtls_ssl_context structures.
*
* \warning The conf structure will be accessed during the session.
* It must not be modified or freed as long as the session
* is active.
*
* \warning This function must be called exactly once per context.
* Calling mbedtls_ssl_setup again is not supported, even
* if no session is active.
*
* \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
* subsystem must have been initialized by calling
* psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param conf SSL configuration to use
*
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if
* memory allocation failed
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_setup(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
/**
* \brief Reset an already initialized SSL context for re-use
* while retaining application-set variables, function
* pointers and data.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \return 0 if successful, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED or
MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_session_reset(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Set the current endpoint type
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param endpoint must be MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_endpoint(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int endpoint);
/**
* \brief Get the current endpoint type
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
*
* \return Endpoint type, either MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT
* or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_endpoint(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint);
}
/**
* \brief Set the transport type (TLS or DTLS).
* Default: TLS
*
* \note For DTLS, you must either provide a recv callback that
* doesn't block, or one that handles timeouts, see
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(). You also need to provide timer
* callbacks with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param transport transport type:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS,
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int transport);
/**
* \brief Set the certificate verification mode
* Default: NONE on server, REQUIRED on client
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param authmode can be:
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE: peer certificate is not checked
* (default on server)
* (insecure on client)
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL: peer certificate is checked, however the
* handshake continues even if verification failed;
* mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() can be called after the
* handshake is complete.
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED: peer *must* present a valid certificate,
* handshake is aborted if verification failed.
* (default on client)
*
* \note On client, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED is the recommended mode.
* With MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL, the user needs to call mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result() at
* the right time(s), which may not be obvious, while REQUIRED always perform
* the verification as soon as possible. For example, REQUIRED was protecting
* against the "triple handshake" attack even before it was found.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int authmode);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
/**
* \brief Set the early data mode
* Default: disabled on server and client
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param early_data_enabled can be:
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_DISABLED:
* Early data functionality is disabled. This is the default on client and
* server.
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_ENABLED:
* Early data functionality is enabled and may be negotiated in the handshake.
* Application using early data functionality needs to be aware that the
* security properties for early data (also refered to as 0-RTT data) are
* weaker than those for other kinds of TLS data. See the documentation of
* mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() and mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data() for more
* information.
* When early data functionality is enabled on server and only in that case,
* the call to one of the APIs that trigger or resume an handshake sequence,
* namely mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
* mbedtls_ssl_read() or mbedtls_ssl_write() may return with the error code
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA indicating that some early data have
* been received. To read the early data, call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* before calling the original function again.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int early_data_enabled);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Set the maximum amount of 0-RTT data in bytes
* Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_EARLY_DATA_SIZE
*
* This function sets the value of the max_early_data_size
* field of the early data indication extension included in
* the NewSessionTicket messages that the server may send.
*
* The value defines the maximum amount of 0-RTT data
* in bytes that a client will be allowed to send when using
* one of the tickets defined by the NewSessionTicket messages.
*
* \note When resuming a session using a ticket, if the server receives more
* early data than allowed for the ticket, it terminates the connection.
* The maximum amount of 0-RTT data should thus be large enough
* to allow a minimum of early data to be exchanged.
*
* \param[in] conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param[in] max_early_data_size The maximum amount of 0-RTT data.
*
* \warning This interface DOES NOT influence/limit the amount of early data
* that can be received through previously created and issued tickets,
* which clients may have stored.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_early_data_size(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t max_early_data_size);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Set the verification callback (Optional).
*
* If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
* certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
* root. For more information, please see the documentation of
* \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
*
* \note For per context callbacks and contexts, please use
* mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() instead.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
* \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/**
* \brief Set the random number generator callback
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_rng RNG function (mandatory)
* \param p_rng RNG parameter
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_rng(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t),
void *p_rng);
/**
* \brief Set the debug callback
*
* The callback has the following argument:
* void * opaque context for the callback
* int debug level
* const char * file name
* int line number
* const char * message
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_dbg debug function
* \param p_dbg debug parameter
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dbg(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
void (*f_dbg)(void *, int, const char *, int, const char *),
void *p_dbg);
/**
* \brief Return the SSL configuration structure associated
* with the given SSL context.
*
* \note The pointer returned by this function is guaranteed to
* remain valid until the context is freed.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query.
* \return Pointer to the SSL configuration associated with \p ssl.
*/
static inline const mbedtls_ssl_config *mbedtls_ssl_context_get_config(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(conf);
}
/**
* \brief Set the underlying BIO callbacks for write, read and
* read-with-timeout.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param p_bio parameter (context) shared by BIO callbacks
* \param f_send write callback
* \param f_recv read callback
* \param f_recv_timeout blocking read callback with timeout.
*
* \note One of f_recv or f_recv_timeout can be NULL, in which case
* the other is used. If both are non-NULL, f_recv_timeout is
* used and f_recv is ignored (as if it were NULL).
*
* \note The two most common use cases are:
* - non-blocking I/O, f_recv != NULL, f_recv_timeout == NULL
* - blocking I/O, f_recv == NULL, f_recv_timeout != NULL
*
* \note For DTLS, you need to provide either a non-NULL
* f_recv_timeout callback, or a f_recv that doesn't block.
*
* \note See the documentations of \c mbedtls_ssl_send_t,
* \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_t and \c mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t for
* the conventions those callbacks must follow.
*
* \note On some platforms, net_sockets.c provides
* \c mbedtls_net_send(), \c mbedtls_net_recv() and
* \c mbedtls_net_recv_timeout() that are suitable to be used
* here.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
void *p_bio,
mbedtls_ssl_send_t *f_send,
mbedtls_ssl_recv_t *f_recv,
mbedtls_ssl_recv_timeout_t *f_recv_timeout);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
/**
* \brief Configure the use of the Connection ID (CID)
* extension in the next handshake.
*
* Reference: RFC 9146 (or draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
* for legacy version)
*
* The DTLS CID extension allows the reliable association of
* DTLS records to DTLS connections across changes in the
* underlying transport (changed IP and Port metadata) by
* adding explicit connection identifiers (CIDs) to the
* headers of encrypted DTLS records. The desired CIDs are
* configured by the application layer and are exchanged in
* new `ClientHello` / `ServerHello` extensions during the
* handshake, where each side indicates the CID it wants the
* peer to use when writing encrypted messages. The CIDs are
* put to use once records get encrypted: the stack discards
* any incoming records that don't include the configured CID
* in their header, and adds the peer's requested CID to the
* headers of outgoing messages.
*
* This API enables or disables the use of the CID extension
* in the next handshake and sets the value of the CID to
* be used for incoming messages.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure. This must be initialized.
* \param enable This value determines whether the CID extension should
* be used or not. Possible values are:
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED to enable the use of the CID.
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (default) to disable the use
* of the CID.
* \param own_cid The address of the readable buffer holding the CID we want
* the peer to use when sending encrypted messages to us.
* This may be \c NULL if \p own_cid_len is \c 0.
* This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
* \param own_cid_len The length of \p own_cid.
* This parameter is unused if \p enable is set to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
*
* \note The value of \p own_cid_len must match the value of the
* \c len parameter passed to mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid()
* when configuring the ::mbedtls_ssl_config that \p ssl
* is bound to.
*
* \note This CID configuration applies to subsequent handshakes
* performed on the SSL context \p ssl, but does not trigger
* one. You still have to call `mbedtls_ssl_handshake()`
* (for the initial handshake) or `mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()`
* (for a renegotiation handshake) explicitly after a
* successful call to this function to run the handshake.
*
* \note This call cannot guarantee that the use of the CID
* will be successfully negotiated in the next handshake,
* because the peer might not support it. Specifically:
* - On the Client, enabling the use of the CID through
* this call implies that the `ClientHello` in the next
* handshake will include the CID extension, thereby
* offering the use of the CID to the server. Only if
* the `ServerHello` contains the CID extension, too,
* the CID extension will actually be put to use.
* - On the Server, enabling the use of the CID through
* this call implies that the server will look for
* the CID extension in a `ClientHello` from the client,
* and, if present, reply with a CID extension in its
* `ServerHello`.
*
* \note To check whether the use of the CID was negotiated
* after the subsequent handshake has completed, please
* use the API mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid().
*
* \warning If the use of the CID extension is enabled in this call
* and the subsequent handshake negotiates its use, Mbed TLS
* will silently drop every packet whose CID does not match
* the CID configured in \p own_cid. It is the responsibility
* of the user to adapt the underlying transport to take care
* of CID-based demultiplexing before handing datagrams to
* Mbed TLS.
*
* \return \c 0 on success. In this case, the CID configuration
* applies to the next handshake.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int enable,
unsigned char const *own_cid,
size_t own_cid_len);
/**
* \brief Get information about our request for usage of the CID
* extension in the current connection.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query.
* \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
* is requested to be used or not. If the CID is
* requested, `*enabled` is set to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED; otherwise, it is set to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
* \param own_cid The address of the buffer in which to store our own
* CID (if the CID extension is requested). This may be
* \c NULL in case the value of our CID isn't needed. If
* it is not \c NULL, \p own_cid_len must not be \c NULL.
* \param own_cid_len The address at which to store the size of our own CID
* (if the CID extension is requested). This is also the
* number of Bytes in \p own_cid that have been written.
* This may be \c NULL in case the length of our own CID
* isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p own_cid must be
* \c NULL, too.
*
*\note If we are requesting an empty CID this function sets
* `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED (the rationale
* for this is that the resulting outcome is the
* same as if the CID extensions wasn't requested).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_own_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int *enabled,
unsigned char own_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX],
size_t *own_cid_len);
/**
* \brief Get information about the use of the CID extension
* in the current connection.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query.
* \param enabled The address at which to store whether the CID extension
* is currently in use or not. If the CID is in use,
* `*enabled` is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
* otherwise, it is set to MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED.
* \param peer_cid The address of the buffer in which to store the CID
* chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
* This may be \c NULL in case the value of peer CID
* isn't needed. If it is not \c NULL, \p peer_cid_len
* must not be \c NULL.
* \param peer_cid_len The address at which to store the size of the CID
* chosen by the peer (if the CID extension is used).
* This is also the number of Bytes in \p peer_cid that
* have been written.
* This may be \c NULL in case the length of the peer CID
* isn't needed. If it is \c NULL, \p peer_cid must be
* \c NULL, too.
*
* \note This applies to the state of the CID negotiated in
* the last complete handshake. If a handshake is in
* progress, this function will attempt to complete
* the handshake first.
*
* \note If CID extensions have been exchanged but both client
* and server chose to use an empty CID, this function
* sets `*enabled` to #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED
* (the rationale for this is that the resulting
* communication is the same as if the CID extensions
* hadn't been used).
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return A negative error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cid(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int *enabled,
unsigned char peer_cid[MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX],
size_t *peer_cid_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
/**
* \brief Set the Maximum Transport Unit (MTU).
* Special value: 0 means unset (no limit).
* This represents the maximum size of a datagram payload
* handled by the transport layer (usually UDP) as determined
* by the network link and stack. In practice, this controls
* the maximum size datagram the DTLS layer will pass to the
* \c f_send() callback set using \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
*
* \note The limit on datagram size is converted to a limit on
* record payload by subtracting the current overhead of
* encapsulation and encryption/authentication if any.
*
* \note This can be called at any point during the connection, for
* example when a Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU)
* estimate becomes available from other sources,
* such as lower (or higher) protocol layers.
*
* \note This setting only controls the size of the packets we send,
* and does not restrict the size of the datagrams we're
* willing to receive. Client-side, you can request the
* server to use smaller records with \c
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len().
*
* \note If both a MTU and a maximum fragment length have been
* configured (or negotiated with the peer), the resulting
* lower limit on record payload (see first note) is used.
*
* \note This can only be used to decrease the maximum size
* of datagrams (hence records, see first note) sent. It
* cannot be used to increase the maximum size of records over
* the limit set by #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN.
*
* \note Values lower than the current record layer expansion will
* result in an error when trying to send data.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param mtu Value of the path MTU in bytes
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, uint16_t mtu);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Set a connection-specific verification callback (optional).
*
* If set, the provided verify callback is called for each
* certificate in the peer's CRT chain, including the trusted
* root. For more information, please see the documentation of
* \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify().
*
* \note This call is analogous to mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() but
* binds the verification callback and context to an SSL context
* as opposed to an SSL configuration.
* If mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() and mbedtls_ssl_set_verify()
* are both used, mbedtls_ssl_set_verify() takes precedence.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
* \param f_vrfy The verification callback to use during CRT verification.
* \param p_vrfy The opaque context to be passed to the callback.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_verify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int (*f_vrfy)(void *, mbedtls_x509_crt *, int, uint32_t *),
void *p_vrfy);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
/**
* \brief Set the timeout period for mbedtls_ssl_read()
* (Default: no timeout.)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
* \param timeout Timeout value in milliseconds.
* Use 0 for no timeout (default).
*
* \note With blocking I/O, this will only work if a non-NULL
* \c f_recv_timeout was set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_bio().
* With non-blocking I/O, this will only work if timer
* callbacks were set with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb().
*
* \note With non-blocking I/O, you may also skip this function
* altogether and handle timeouts at the application layer.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_read_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t timeout);
/**
* \brief Check whether a buffer contains a valid and authentic record
* that has not been seen before. (DTLS only).
*
* This function does not change the user-visible state
* of the SSL context. Its sole purpose is to provide
* an indication of the legitimacy of an incoming record.
*
* This can be useful e.g. in distributed server environments
* using the DTLS Connection ID feature, in which connections
* might need to be passed between service instances on a change
* of peer address, but where such disruptive operations should
* only happen after the validity of incoming records has been
* confirmed.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
* \param buf The address of the buffer holding the record to be checked.
* This must be a read/write buffer of length \p buflen Bytes.
* \param buflen The length of \p buf in Bytes.
*
* \note This routine only checks whether the provided buffer begins
* with a valid and authentic record that has not been seen
* before, but does not check potential data following the
* initial record. In particular, it is possible to pass DTLS
* datagrams containing multiple records, in which case only
* the first record is checked.
*
* \note This function modifies the input buffer \p buf. If you need
* to preserve the original record, you have to maintain a copy.
*
* \return \c 0 if the record is valid and authentic and has not been
* seen before.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if the check completed
* successfully but the record was found to be not authentic.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_RECORD if the check completed
* successfully but the record was found to be invalid for
* a reason different from authenticity checking.
* \return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_RECORD if the check completed
* successfully but the record was found to be unexpected
* in the state of the SSL context, including replayed records.
* \return Another negative error code on different kinds of failure.
* In this case, the SSL context becomes unusable and needs
* to be freed or reset before reuse.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_check_record(mbedtls_ssl_context const *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buflen);
/**
* \brief Set the timer callbacks (Mandatory for DTLS.)
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param p_timer parameter (context) shared by timer callbacks
* \param f_set_timer set timer callback
* \param f_get_timer get timer callback. Must return:
*
* \note See the documentation of \c mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t and
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t for the conventions this pair of
* callbacks must follow.
*
* \note On some platforms, timing.c provides
* \c mbedtls_timing_set_delay() and
* \c mbedtls_timing_get_delay() that are suitable for using
* here, except if using an event-driven style.
*
* \note See also the "DTLS tutorial" article in our knowledge base.
* https://mbed-tls.readthedocs.io/en/latest/kb/how-to/dtls-tutorial
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
void *p_timer,
mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_t *f_set_timer,
mbedtls_ssl_get_timer_t *f_get_timer);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Set the certificate selection callback (server-side only).
*
* If set, the callback is always called for each handshake,
* after `ClientHello` processing has finished.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_cert_cb The callback for selecting server certificate after
* `ClientHello` processing has finished.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_hs_cb_t f_cert_cb)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(f_cert_cb) = f_cert_cb;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/**
* \brief Callback type: generate and write session ticket
*
* \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
* This callback should generate an encrypted and
* authenticated ticket for the session and write it to the
* output buffer. Here, ticket means the opaque ticket part
* of the NewSessionTicket structure of RFC 5077.
*
* \param p_ticket Context for the callback
* \param session SSL session to be written in the ticket
* \param start Start of the output buffer
* \param end End of the output buffer
* \param tlen On exit, holds the length written
* \param lifetime On exit, holds the lifetime of the ticket in seconds
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
* a specific MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX code.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t(void *p_ticket,
const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *start,
const unsigned char *end,
size_t *tlen,
uint32_t *lifetime);
/**
* \brief Callback type: parse and load session ticket
*
* \note This describes what a callback implementation should do.
* This callback should parse a session ticket as generated
* by the corresponding mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t function,
* and, if the ticket is authentic and valid, load the
* session.
*
* \note The implementation is allowed to modify the first len
* bytes of the input buffer, eg to use it as a temporary
* area for the decrypted ticket contents.
*
* \param p_ticket Context for the callback
* \param session SSL session to be loaded
* \param buf Start of the buffer containing the ticket
* \param len Length of the ticket.
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC if not authentic, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED if expired, or
* any other non-zero code for other failures.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t(void *p_ticket,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Configure SSL session ticket callbacks (server only).
* (Default: none.)
*
* \note On server, session tickets are enabled by providing
* non-NULL callbacks.
*
* \note On client, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
* \param f_ticket_write Callback for writing a ticket
* \param f_ticket_parse Callback for parsing a ticket
* \param p_ticket Context shared by the two callbacks
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write_t *f_ticket_write,
mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse_t *f_ticket_parse,
void *p_ticket);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
/**
* \brief Get the creation time of a session ticket.
*
* \note See the documentation of \c ticket_creation_time for information about
* the intended usage of this function.
*
* \param session SSL session
* \param ticket_creation_time On exit, holds the ticket creation time in
* milliseconds.
*
* \return 0 on success,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if an input is not valid.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ticket_creation_time(
mbedtls_ssl_session *session, mbedtls_ms_time_t *ticket_creation_time)
{
if (session == NULL || ticket_creation_time == NULL ||
session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(endpoint) != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER) {
return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA;
}
*ticket_creation_time = session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ticket_creation_time);
return 0;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
/**
* \brief Get the session-id buffer.
*
* \param session SSL session.
*
* \return The address of the session-id buffer.
*/
static inline unsigned const char (*mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *
session))[32]
{
return &session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
}
/**
* \brief Get the size of the session-id.
*
* \param session SSL session.
*
* \return size_t size of session-id buffer.
*/
static inline size_t mbedtls_ssl_session_get_id_len(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
{
return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id_len);
}
/**
* \brief Get the ciphersuite-id.
*
* \param session SSL session.
*
* \return int represetation for ciphersuite.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_session_get_ciphersuite_id(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
{
return session->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ciphersuite);
}
/**
* \brief Configure a key export callback.
* (Default: none.)
*
* This API can be used for two purposes:
* - Debugging: Use this API to e.g. generate an NSSKeylog
* file and use it to inspect encrypted traffic in tools
* such as Wireshark.
* - Application-specific export: Use this API to implement
* key exporters, e.g. for EAP-TLS or DTLS-SRTP.
*
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to which the export
* callback should be attached.
* \param f_export_keys The callback for the key export.
* \param p_export_keys The opaque context pointer to be passed to the
* callback \p f_export_keys.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_export_keys_cb(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_t *f_export_keys,
void *p_export_keys);
/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to a pointer.
*
* You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p().
*
* \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
* of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
* \param p The new value of the user data.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
void *p)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
}
/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL configuration to an integer.
*
* You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n().
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
* \param n The new value of the user data.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
uintptr_t n)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
}
/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as a pointer.
*
* This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p(), or
* \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
* called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has
* been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p().
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
* \return The current value of the user data.
*/
static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_p(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
}
/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL configuration as an integer.
*
* This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n(), or
* \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
* called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_p() has
* been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_user_data_n().
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration context to modify.
* \return The current value of the user data.
*/
static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_user_data_n(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf)
{
return conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
}
/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to a pointer.
*
* You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p().
*
* \note The library stores \c p without accessing it. It is the responsibility
* of the caller to ensure that the pointer remains valid.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
* \param p The new value of the user data.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
void *p)
{
ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p = p;
}
/** \brief Set the user data in an SSL context to an integer.
*
* You can retrieve this value later with mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
* \param n The new value of the user data.
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
uintptr_t n)
{
ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n = n;
}
/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as a pointer.
*
* This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p(), or
* \c NULL if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has not previously been
* called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has
* been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
* \return The current value of the user data.
*/
static inline void *mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_p(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).p;
}
/** \brief Retrieve the user data in an SSL context as an integer.
*
* This is the value last set with mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n(), or
* \c 0 if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() has not previously been
* called. The value is undefined if mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() has
* been called without a subsequent call to mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to modify.
* \return The current value of the user data.
*/
static inline uintptr_t mbedtls_ssl_get_user_data_n(
mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_data).n;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE)
/**
* \brief Configure asynchronous private key operation callbacks.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
* \param f_async_sign Callback to start a signature operation. See
* the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t
* for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
* external processor does not support any signature
* operation; in this case the private key object
* associated with the certificate will be used.
* \param f_async_decrypt Callback to start a decryption operation. See
* the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t
* for more information. This may be \c NULL if the
* external processor does not support any decryption
* operation; in this case the private key object
* associated with the certificate will be used.
* \param f_async_resume Callback to resume an asynchronous operation. See
* the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t
* for more information. This may not be \c NULL unless
* \p f_async_sign and \p f_async_decrypt are both
* \c NULL.
* \param f_async_cancel Callback to cancel an asynchronous operation. See
* the description of ::mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t
* for more information. This may be \c NULL if
* no cleanup is needed.
* \param config_data A pointer to configuration data which can be
* retrieved with
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(). The
* library stores this value without dereferencing it.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_async_sign_t *f_async_sign,
mbedtls_ssl_async_decrypt_t *f_async_decrypt,
mbedtls_ssl_async_resume_t *f_async_resume,
mbedtls_ssl_async_cancel_t *f_async_cancel,
void *config_data);
/**
* \brief Retrieve the configuration data set by
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
* \return The configuration data set by
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb().
*/
void *mbedtls_ssl_conf_get_async_config_data(const mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
/**
* \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
*
* \note This function may only be called while a handshake
* is in progress.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to access.
*
* \return The asynchronous operation user context that was last
* set during the current handshake. If
* mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data() has not yet been
* called during the current handshake, this function returns
* \c NULL.
*/
void *mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Retrieve the asynchronous operation user context.
*
* \note This function may only be called while a handshake
* is in progress.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to access.
* \param ctx The new value of the asynchronous operation user context.
* Call mbedtls_ssl_get_async_operation_data() later during the
* same handshake to retrieve this value.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_async_operation_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
void *ctx);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ASYNC_PRIVATE */
/**
* \brief Callback type: generate a cookie
*
* \param ctx Context for the callback
* \param p Buffer to write to,
* must be updated to point right after the cookie
* \param end Pointer to one past the end of the output buffer
* \param info Client ID info that was passed to
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
* \param ilen Length of info in bytes
*
* \return The callback must return 0 on success,
* or a negative error code.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t(void *ctx,
unsigned char **p, unsigned char *end,
const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
/**
* \brief Callback type: verify a cookie
*
* \param ctx Context for the callback
* \param cookie Cookie to verify
* \param clen Length of cookie
* \param info Client ID info that was passed to
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id()
* \param ilen Length of info in bytes
*
* \return The callback must return 0 if cookie is valid,
* or a negative error code.
*/
typedef int mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t(void *ctx,
const unsigned char *cookie, size_t clen,
const unsigned char *info, size_t ilen);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Register callbacks for DTLS cookies
* (Server only. DTLS only.)
*
* Default: dummy callbacks that fail, in order to force you to
* register working callbacks (and initialize their context).
*
* To disable HelloVerifyRequest, register NULL callbacks.
*
* \warning Disabling hello verification allows your server to be used
* for amplification in DoS attacks against other hosts.
* Only disable if you known this can't happen in your
* particular environment.
*
* \note See comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() about handling
* the MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED that is expected
* on the first handshake attempt when this is enabled.
*
* \note This is also necessary to handle client reconnection from
* the same port as described in RFC 6347 section 4.2.8 (only
* the variant with cookies is supported currently). See
* comments on \c mbedtls_ssl_read() for details.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_cookie_write Cookie write callback
* \param f_cookie_check Cookie check callback
* \param p_cookie Context for both callbacks
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write,
mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check,
void *p_cookie);
/**
* \brief Set client's transport-level identification info.
* (Server only. DTLS only.)
*
* This is usually the IP address (and port), but could be
* anything identify the client depending on the underlying
* network stack. Used for HelloVerifyRequest with DTLS.
* This is *not* used to route the actual packets.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param info Transport-level info identifying the client (eg IP + port)
* \param ilen Length of info in bytes
*
* \note An internal copy is made, so the info buffer can be reused.
*
* \return 0 on success,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if used on client,
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if out of memory.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *info,
size_t ilen);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY && MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY)
/**
* \brief Enable or disable anti-replay protection for DTLS.
* (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
* Default: enabled.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param mode MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ANTI_REPLAY_DISABLED.
*
* \warning Disabling this is a security risk unless the application
* protocol handles duplicated packets in a safe way. You
* should not disable this without careful consideration.
* However, if your application already detects duplicated
* packets and needs information about them to adjust its
* transmission strategy, then you'll want to disable this.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_anti_replay(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char mode);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY */
/**
* \brief Set a limit on the number of records with a bad MAC
* before terminating the connection.
* (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
* Default: 0 (disabled).
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param limit Limit, or 0 to disable.
*
* \note If the limit is N, then the connection is terminated when
* the Nth non-authentic record is seen.
*
* \note Records with an invalid header are not counted, only the
* ones going through the authentication-decryption phase.
*
* \note This is a security trade-off related to the fact that it's
* often relatively easy for an active attacker to inject UDP
* datagrams. On one hand, setting a low limit here makes it
* easier for such an attacker to forcibly terminated a
* connection. On the other hand, a high limit or no limit
* might make us waste resources checking authentication on
* many bogus packets.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_badmac_limit(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned limit);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
/**
* \brief Allow or disallow packing of multiple handshake records
* within a single datagram.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure.
* \param allow_packing This determines whether datagram packing may
* be used or not. A value of \c 0 means that every
* record will be sent in a separate datagram; a
* value of \c 1 means that, if space permits,
* multiple handshake messages (including CCS) belonging to
* a single flight may be packed within a single datagram.
*
* \note This is enabled by default and should only be disabled
* for test purposes, or if datagram packing causes
* interoperability issues with peers that don't support it.
*
* \note Allowing datagram packing reduces the network load since
* there's less overhead if multiple messages share the same
* datagram. Also, it increases the handshake efficiency
* since messages belonging to a single datagram will not
* be reordered in transit, and so future message buffering
* or flight retransmission (if no buffering is used) as
* means to deal with reordering are needed less frequently.
*
* \note Application records are not affected by this option and
* are currently always sent in separate datagrams.
*
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_datagram_packing(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned allow_packing);
/**
* \brief Set retransmit timeout values for the DTLS handshake.
* (DTLS only, no effect on TLS.)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param min Initial timeout value in milliseconds.
* Default: 1000 (1 second).
* \param max Maximum timeout value in milliseconds.
* Default: 60000 (60 seconds).
*
* \note Default values are from RFC 6347 section 4.2.4.1.
*
* \note The 'min' value should typically be slightly above the
* expected round-trip time to your peer, plus whatever time
* it takes for the peer to process the message. For example,
* if your RTT is about 600ms and you peer needs up to 1s to
* do the cryptographic operations in the handshake, then you
* should set 'min' slightly above 1600. Lower values of 'min'
* might cause spurious resends which waste network resources,
* while larger value of 'min' will increase overall latency
* on unreliable network links.
*
* \note The more unreliable your network connection is, the larger
* your max / min ratio needs to be in order to achieve
* reliable handshakes.
*
* \note Messages are retransmitted up to log2(ceil(max/min)) times.
* For example, if min = 1s and max = 5s, the retransmit plan
* goes: send ... 1s -> resend ... 2s -> resend ... 4s ->
* resend ... 5s -> give up and return a timeout error.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_handshake_timeout(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, uint32_t min, uint32_t max);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Set the session cache callbacks (server-side only)
* If not set, no session resuming is done (except if session
* tickets are enabled too).
*
* The session cache has the responsibility to check for stale
* entries based on timeout. See RFC 5246 for recommendations.
*
* Warning: session.peer_cert is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer on
* connection shutdown, so do not cache the pointer! Either set
* it to NULL or make a full copy of the certificate.
*
* The get callback is called once during the initial handshake
* to enable session resuming. The get function has the
* following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_session *session)
* If a valid entry is found, it should fill the master of
* the session object with the cached values and return 0,
* return 1 otherwise. Optionally peer_cert can be set as well
* if it is properly present in cache entry.
*
* The set callback is called once during the initial handshake
* to enable session resuming after the entire handshake has
* been finished. The set function has the following parameters:
* (void *parameter, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session). The function
* should create a cache entry for future retrieval based on
* the data in the session structure and should keep in mind
* that the mbedtls_ssl_session object presented (and all its referenced
* data) is cleared by the SSL/TLS layer when the connection is
* terminated. It is recommended to add metadata to determine if
* an entry is still valid in the future. Return 0 if
* successfully cached, return 1 otherwise.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param p_cache parameter (context) for both callbacks
* \param f_get_cache session get callback
* \param f_set_cache session set callback
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_cache(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
void *p_cache,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_get_t *f_get_cache,
mbedtls_ssl_cache_set_t *f_set_cache);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Load a session for session resumption.
*
* Sessions loaded through this call will be considered
* for session resumption in the next handshake.
*
* \note Even if this call succeeds, it is not guaranteed that
* the next handshake will indeed be shortened through the
* use of session resumption: The server is always free
* to reject any attempt for resumption and fall back to
* a full handshake.
*
* \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
* resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption
* and ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
* sessions equate to tickets, and loading one session by
* calling this function will lead to its corresponding ticket
* being advertised as resumption PSK by the client. This
* depends on session tickets being enabled (see
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option) though.
* If session tickets are disabled, a call to this function
* with a TLS 1.3 session, will not have any effect on the next
* handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection which should
* be attempted to be setup using session resumption. This
* must be initialized via mbedtls_ssl_init() and bound to
* an SSL configuration via mbedtls_ssl_setup(), but
* the handshake must not yet have been started.
* \param session The session to be considered for session resumption.
* This must be a session previously exported via
* mbedtls_ssl_get_session(), and potentially serialized and
* deserialized through mbedtls_ssl_session_save() and
* mbedtls_ssl_session_load() in the meantime.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the session
* could not be loaded because one session has already been
* loaded. This error is non-fatal, and has no observable
* effect on the SSL context or the session that was attempted
* to be loaded.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_session()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_session(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/**
* \brief Load serialized session data into a session structure.
* On client, this can be used for loading saved sessions
* before resuming them with mbedtls_ssl_set_session().
* On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
* of session cache or session tickets.
*
* \warning If a peer certificate chain is associated with the session,
* the serialized state will only contain the peer's
* end-entity certificate and the result of the chain
* verification (unless verification was disabled), but not
* the rest of the chain.
*
* \see mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
* \see mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
*
* \param session The session structure to be populated. It must have been
* initialised with mbedtls_ssl_session_init() but not
* populated yet.
* \param buf The buffer holding the serialized session data. It must be a
* readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
* \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
* was generated in a different version or configuration of
* Mbed TLS.
* \return Another negative value for other kinds of errors (for
* example, unsupported features in the embedded certificate).
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_session_load(mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len);
/**
* \brief Save session structure as serialized data in a buffer.
* On client, this can be used for saving session data,
* potentially in non-volatile storage, for resuming later.
* On server, this can be used for alternative implementations
* of session cache or session tickets.
*
* \see mbedtls_ssl_session_load()
*
* \param session The session structure to be saved.
* \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
* writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
* NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
* \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
* \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
* been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
*
* \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
* whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
* to determine the necessary size by calling this function
* with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0.
*
* \note For TLS 1.3 sessions, this feature is supported only if the
* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is enabled,
* as in TLS 1.3 session resumption is possible only with
* tickets.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if the
* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration option is disabled
* and the session is a TLS 1.3 session.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_session_save(const mbedtls_ssl_session *session,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_len,
size_t *olen);
/**
* \brief Set the list of allowed ciphersuites and the preference
* order. First in the list has the highest preference.
*
* For TLS 1.2, the notion of ciphersuite determines both
* the key exchange mechanism and the suite of symmetric
* algorithms to be used during and after the handshake.
*
* For TLS 1.3 (in development), the notion of ciphersuite
* only determines the suite of symmetric algorithms to be
* used during and after the handshake, while key exchange
* mechanisms are configured separately.
*
* In Mbed TLS, ciphersuites for both TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3
* are configured via this function. For users of TLS 1.3,
* there will be separate API for the configuration of key
* exchange mechanisms.
*
* The list of ciphersuites passed to this function may
* contain a mixture of TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 ciphersuite
* identifiers. This is useful if negotiation of TLS 1.3
* should be attempted, but a fallback to TLS 1.2 would
* be tolerated.
*
* \note By default, the server chooses its preferred
* ciphersuite among those that the client supports. If
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order() is called to prefer
* the client's preferences, the server instead chooses
* the client's preferred ciphersuite among those that
* the server supports.
*
* \warning The ciphersuites array \p ciphersuites is not copied.
* It must remain valid for the lifetime of the SSL
* configuration \p conf.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
* \param ciphersuites A 0-terminated list of IANA identifiers of supported
* ciphersuites, accessible through \c MBEDTLS_TLS_XXX
* and \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_XXX macros defined in
* ssl_ciphersuites.h.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const int *ciphersuites);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/**
* \brief Set the supported key exchange modes for TLS 1.3 connections.
*
* In contrast to TLS 1.2, the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.3 does not
* include the choice of key exchange mechanism. It is therefore not
* covered by the API mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). See the
* documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites() for more
* information on the ciphersuite concept in TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3.
*
* The present function is specific to TLS 1.3 and allows users to
* configure the set of supported key exchange mechanisms in TLS 1.3.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration the change should apply to.
* \param kex_modes A bitwise combination of one or more of the following:
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK
* This flag enables pure-PSK key exchanges.
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_EPHEMERAL
* This flag enables combined PSK-ephemeral key exchanges.
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL
* This flag enables pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
* For convenience, the following pre-defined macros are
* available for combinations of the above:
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_ALL
* Includes all of pure-PSK, PSK-ephemeral and pure-ephemeral.
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_PSK_ALL
* Includes both pure-PSK and combined PSK-ephemeral
* key exchanges, but excludes pure-ephemeral key exchanges.
* - MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_KEY_EXCHANGE_MODE_EPHEMERAL_ALL
* Includes both pure-ephemeral and combined PSK-ephemeral
* key exchanges.
*
* \note If a PSK-based key exchange mode shall be supported, applications
* must also use the APIs mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()
* to configure the PSKs to be used.
*
* \note If a pure-ephemeral key exchange mode shall be supported,
* server-side applications must also provide a certificate via
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert().
*
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_key_exchange_modes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const int kex_modes);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE 0
#define MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL 1
/**
* \brief Specify the length of Connection IDs for incoming
* encrypted DTLS records, as well as the behaviour
* on unexpected CIDs.
*
* By default, the CID length is set to \c 0,
* and unexpected CIDs are silently ignored.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to modify.
* \param len The length in Bytes of the CID fields in encrypted
* DTLS records using the CID mechanism. This must
* not be larger than #MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX.
* \param ignore_other_cids This determines the stack's behaviour when
* receiving a record with an unexpected CID.
* Possible values are:
* - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_IGNORE
* In this case, the record is silently ignored.
* - #MBEDTLS_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID_FAIL
* In this case, the stack fails with the specific
* error code #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_CID.
*
* \note The CID specification allows implementations to either
* use a common length for all incoming connection IDs or
* allow variable-length incoming IDs. Mbed TLS currently
* requires a common length for all connections sharing the
* same SSL configuration; this allows simpler parsing of
* record headers.
*
* \return \c 0 on success.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if \p len
* is too large.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_cid(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, size_t len,
int ignore_other_cids);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Set the X.509 security profile used for verification
*
* \note The restrictions are enforced for all certificates in the
* chain. However, signatures in the handshake are not covered
* by this setting but by \b mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param profile Profile to use
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const mbedtls_x509_crt_profile *profile);
/**
* \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate
*
* \note See \c mbedtls_x509_crt_verify() for notes regarding the
* parameters ca_chain (maps to trust_ca for that function)
* and ca_crl.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
* \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
*
* \note If not set, subject distinguished names (DNs) are taken
* from \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain()
* or \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain())
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
* from which the client should select client peer certificate.
*/
static inline
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dn_hints) = crt;
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK)
/**
* \brief Set the trusted certificate callback.
*
* This API allows to register the set of trusted certificates
* through a callback, instead of a linked list as configured
* by mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
*
* This is useful for example in contexts where a large number
* of CAs are used, and the inefficiency of maintaining them
* in a linked list cannot be tolerated. It is also useful when
* the set of trusted CAs needs to be modified frequently.
*
* See the documentation of `mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t` for
* more information.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_ca_cb The trusted certificate callback to use when verifying
* certificate chains.
* \param p_ca_cb The context to be passed to \p f_ca_cb (for example,
* a reference to a trusted CA database).
*
* \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain():
* Any call to this function overwrites the values set through
* earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() or
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb().
*
* \note This API is incompatible with CA indication in
* CertificateRequest messages: A server-side SSL context which
* is bound to an SSL configuration that uses a CA callback
* configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), and which requires
* client authentication, will send an empty CA list in the
* corresponding CertificateRequest message.
*
* \note This API is incompatible with mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain():
* If an SSL context is bound to an SSL configuration which uses
* CA callbacks configured via mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(), then
* calls to mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() have no effect.
*
* \note The use of this API disables the use of restartable ECC
* during X.509 CRT signature verification (but doesn't affect
* other uses).
*
* \warning This API is incompatible with the use of CRLs. Any call to
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb() unsets CRLs configured through
* earlier calls to mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain().
*
* \warning In multi-threaded environments, the callback \p f_ca_cb
* must be thread-safe, and it is the user's responsibility
* to guarantee this (for example through a mutex
* contained in the callback context pointed to by \p p_ca_cb).
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_x509_crt_ca_cb_t f_ca_cb,
void *p_ca_cb);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_TRUSTED_CERTIFICATE_CALLBACK */
/**
* \brief Set own certificate chain and private key
*
* \note own_cert should contain in order from the bottom up your
* certificate chain. The top certificate (self-signed)
* can be omitted.
*
* \note On server, this function can be called multiple times to
* provision more than one cert/key pair (eg one ECDSA, one
* RSA with SHA-256, one RSA with SHA-1). An adequate
* certificate will be selected according to the client's
* advertised capabilities. In case multiple certificates are
* adequate, preference is given to the one set by the first
* call to this function, then second, etc.
*
* \note On client, only the first call has any effect. That is,
* only one client certificate can be provisioned. The
* server's preferences in its CertificateRequest message will
* be ignored and our only cert will be sent regardless of
* whether it matches those preferences - the server can then
* decide what it wants to do with it.
*
* \note The provided \p pk_key needs to match the public key in the
* first certificate in \p own_cert, or all handshakes using
* that certificate will fail. It is your responsibility
* to ensure that; this function will not perform any check.
* You may use mbedtls_pk_check_pair() in order to perform
* this check yourself, but be aware that this function can
* be computationally expensive on some key types.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param own_cert own public certificate chain
* \param pk_key own private key
*
* \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Configure pre-shared keys (PSKs) and their
* identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* Only one PSK can be registered, through either
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
* fails, though this may change in future versions, which
* may add support for multiple PSKs.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \note A PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() in the PSK callback
* takes precedence over a PSK configured by this function.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key to use.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \note The PSK and its identity are copied internally and
* hence need not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime
* of the SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
* can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len,
const unsigned char *psk_identity, size_t psk_identity_len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Configure one or more opaque pre-shared keys (PSKs) and
* their identities to be used in PSK-based ciphersuites.
*
* Only one PSK can be registered, through either
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
* If you attempt to register more than one PSK, this function
* fails, though this may change in future versions, which
* may add support for multiple PSKs.
*
* \note This is mainly useful for clients. Servers will usually
* want to use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb() instead.
*
* \note An opaque PSK set by \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque() in
* the PSK callback takes precedence over an opaque PSK
* configured by this function.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the PSK with.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* Until \p conf is destroyed or this function is successfully
* called again, the key slot \p psk must be populated with a
* key of type PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy
* allows its use for the key derivation algorithm applied
* in the handshake.
* \param psk_identity The pointer to the pre-shared key identity.
* \param psk_identity_len The length of the pre-shared key identity
* in bytes.
*
* \note The PSK identity hint is copied internally and hence need
* not be preserved by the caller for the lifetime of the
* SSL configuration.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE if no more PSKs
* can be configured. In this case, the old PSK(s) remain intact.
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk,
const unsigned char *psk_identity,
size_t psk_identity_len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
/**
* \brief Set the pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \note A PSK set by this function takes precedence over a PSK
* configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The pointer to the pre-shared key.
* \param psk_len The length of the pre-shared key in bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *psk, size_t psk_len);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
/**
* \brief Set an opaque pre-shared Key (PSK) for the current handshake.
*
* \note This should only be called inside the PSK callback,
* i.e. the function passed to \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb().
*
* \note An opaque PSK set by this function takes precedence over an
* opaque PSK configured by \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque().
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to configure a PSK for.
* \param psk The identifier of the key slot holding the PSK.
* For the duration of the current handshake, the key slot
* must be populated with a key of type
* PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION whose policy allows its
* use for the key derivation algorithm
* applied in the handshake.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return An \c MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_XXX error code on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t psk);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Set the PSK callback (server-side only).
*
* If set, the PSK callback is called for each
* handshake where a PSK-based ciphersuite was negotiated.
* The caller provides the identity received and wants to
* receive the actual PSK data and length.
*
* The callback has the following parameters:
* - \c void*: The opaque pointer \p p_psk.
* - \c mbedtls_ssl_context*: The SSL context to which
* the operation applies.
* - \c const unsigned char*: The PSK identity
* selected by the client.
* - \c size_t: The length of the PSK identity
* selected by the client.
*
* If a valid PSK identity is found, the callback should use
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_psk_opaque()
* on the SSL context to set the correct PSK and return \c 0.
* Any other return value will result in a denied PSK identity.
*
* \note A dynamic PSK (i.e. set by the PSK callback) takes
* precedence over a static PSK (i.e. set by
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
* This means that if you set a PSK callback using this
* function, you don't need to set a PSK using
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_opaque()).
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to register the callback with.
* \param f_psk The callback for selecting and setting the PSK based
* in the PSK identity chosen by the client.
* \param p_psk A pointer to an opaque structure to be passed to
* the callback, for example a PSK store.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_psk_cb(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_psk)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
size_t),
void *p_psk);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_PSK_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values
* from big-endian binary presentations.
* (Default values: MBEDTLS_DHM_RFC3526_MODP_2048_[PG]_BIN)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param dhm_P Diffie-Hellman-Merkle modulus in big-endian binary form
* \param P_len Length of DHM modulus
* \param dhm_G Diffie-Hellman-Merkle generator in big-endian binary form
* \param G_len Length of DHM generator
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_bin(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char *dhm_P, size_t P_len,
const unsigned char *dhm_G, size_t G_len);
/**
* \brief Set the Diffie-Hellman public P and G values,
* read from existing context (server-side only)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param dhm_ctx Diffie-Hellman-Merkle context
*
* \return 0 if successful
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dh_param_ctx(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, mbedtls_dhm_context *dhm_ctx);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DHM_C) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Set the minimum length for Diffie-Hellman parameters.
* (Client-side only.)
* (Default: 1024 bits.)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param bitlen Minimum bit length of the DHM prime
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dhm_min_bitlen(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
unsigned int bitlen);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DHM_C && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief Set the allowed curves in order of preference.
*
* On server: this only affects selection of the ECDHE curve;
* the curves used for ECDH and ECDSA are determined by the
* list of available certificates instead.
*
* On client: this affects the list of curves offered for any
* use. The server can override our preference order.
*
* Both sides: limits the set of curves accepted for use in
* ECDHE and in the peer's end-entity certificate.
*
* \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups().
*
* \note This has no influence on which curves are allowed inside the
* certificate chains, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile()
* for that. For the end-entity certificate however, the key
* will be accepted only if it is allowed both by this list
* and by the cert profile.
*
* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
* (preferred curve first).
*
* \note The default list is the same set of curves that
* #mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default allows, plus
* ECDHE-only curves selected according to the same criteria.
* The order favors curves with the lowest resource usage.
*
* \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
* for example if new curves are added to the library.
* New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
* from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
* New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
* keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
* resource usage.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param curves Ordered list of allowed curves,
* terminated by MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE.
*/
void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *curves);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
/**
* \brief Set the allowed groups in order of preference.
*
* On server: This only affects the choice of key agreement mechanism
*
* On client: this affects the list of groups offered for any
* use. The server can override our preference order.
*
* Both sides: limits the set of groups accepted for use in
* key sharing.
*
* \note This function replaces the deprecated mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves(),
* which only allows ECP curves to be configured.
*
* \note The most recent invocation of either mbedtls_ssl_conf_curves()
* or mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups() nullifies all previous invocations
* of both.
*
* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
* (preferred group first).
*
* \note When this function is not called, a default list is used,
* consisting of all supported curves at 255 bits and above,
* and all supported finite fields at 2048 bits and above.
* The order favors groups with the lowest resource usage.
*
* \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
* from the default list unless serious security concerns require it.
* New minor versions of Mbed TLS may change the order in
* keeping with the general principle of favoring the lowest
* resource usage.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param groups List of allowed groups ordered by preference, terminated by 0.
* Must contain valid IANA NamedGroup IDs (provided via either an integer
* or using MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_NAMED_GROUP_XXX macros).
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_groups(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const uint16_t *groups);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
/**
* \brief Set the allowed hashes for signatures during the handshake.
*
* \note This only affects which hashes are offered and can be used
* for signatures during the handshake. Hashes for message
* authentication and the TLS PRF are controlled by the
* ciphersuite, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ciphersuites(). Hashes
* used for certificate signature are controlled by the
* verification profile, see \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_profile().
*
* \deprecated Superseded by mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs().
*
* \note This list should be ordered by decreasing preference
* (preferred hash first).
*
* \note By default, all supported hashes whose length is at least
* 256 bits are allowed. This is the same set as the default
* for certificate verification
* (#mbedtls_x509_crt_profile_default).
* The preference order is currently unspecified and may
* change in future versions.
*
* \note New minor versions of Mbed TLS may extend this list,
* for example if new curves are added to the library.
* New minor versions of Mbed TLS will not remove items
* from this list unless serious security concerns require it.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param hashes Ordered list of allowed signature hashes,
* terminated by \c MBEDTLS_MD_NONE.
*/
void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_hashes(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const int *hashes);
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED && MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
/**
* \brief Configure allowed signature algorithms for use in TLS
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to use.
* \param sig_algs List of allowed IANA values for TLS 1.3 signature algorithms,
* terminated by #MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_NONE. The list must remain
* available throughout the lifetime of the conf object.
* - For TLS 1.3, values of \c MBEDTLS_TLS1_3_SIG_XXXX should be
* used.
* - For TLS 1.2, values should be given as
* "(HashAlgorithm << 8) | SignatureAlgorithm".
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sig_algs(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const uint16_t *sig_algs);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Set or reset the hostname to check against the received
* server certificate. It sets the ServerName TLS extension,
* too, if that extension is enabled. (client-side only)
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param hostname the server hostname, may be NULL to clear hostname
* \note Maximum hostname length MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_HOST_NAME_LEN.
*
* \return 0 if successful, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED on
* allocation failure, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA on
* too long input hostname.
*
* Hostname set to the one provided on success (cleared
* when NULL). On allocation failure hostname is cleared.
* On too long input failure, old hostname is unchanged.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const char *hostname);
/**
* \brief Get the hostname that checked against the received
* server certificate. It is used to set the ServerName
* TLS extension, too, if that extension is enabled.
* (client-side only)
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return const pointer to the hostname value
*/
static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hostname(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(hostname);
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
/**
* \brief Retrieve SNI extension value for the current handshake.
* Available in \c f_cert_cb of \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb(),
* this is the same value passed to \c f_sni callback of
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni() and may be used instead of
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni().
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param name_len pointer into which to store length of returned value.
* 0 if SNI extension is not present or not yet processed.
*
* \return const pointer to SNI extension value.
* - value is valid only when called in \c f_cert_cb
* registered with \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_cb().
* - value is NULL if SNI extension is not present.
* - value is not '\0'-terminated. Use \c name_len for len.
* - value must not be freed.
*/
const unsigned char *mbedtls_ssl_get_hs_sni(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
size_t *name_len);
/**
* \brief Set own certificate and key for the current handshake
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_own_cert() but for use within
* the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
*
* \note Passing null \c own_cert clears the certificate list for
* the current handshake.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param own_cert own public certificate chain
* \param pk_key own private key
*
* \return 0 on success or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *own_cert,
mbedtls_pk_context *pk_key);
/**
* \brief Set the data required to verify peer certificate for the
* current handshake
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_ca_chain() but for use within
* the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param ca_chain trusted CA chain (meaning all fully trusted top-level CAs)
* \param ca_crl trusted CA CRLs
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_x509_crt *ca_chain,
mbedtls_x509_crl *ca_crl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Set DN hints sent to client in CertificateRequest message
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_dn_hints() but for use within
* the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param crt crt chain whose subject DNs are issuer DNs of client certs
* from which the client should select client peer certificate.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_dn_hints(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
/**
* \brief Set authmode for the current handshake.
*
* \note Same as \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_authmode() but for use within
* the SNI callback or the certificate selection callback.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param authmode MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE, MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_REQUIRED
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
int authmode);
/**
* \brief Set server side ServerName TLS extension callback
* (optional, server-side only).
*
* If set, the ServerName callback is called whenever the
* server receives a ServerName TLS extension from the client
* during a handshake. The ServerName callback has the
* following parameters: (void *parameter, mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
* const unsigned char *hostname, size_t len). If a suitable
* certificate is found, the callback must set the
* certificate(s) and key(s) to use with \c
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_own_cert() (can be called repeatedly),
* and may optionally adjust the CA and associated CRL with \c
* mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ca_chain() as well as the client
* authentication mode with \c mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_authmode(),
* then must return 0. If no matching name is found, the
* callback may return non-zero to abort the handshake.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param f_sni verification function
* \param p_sni verification parameter
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_sni(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int (*f_sni)(void *, mbedtls_ssl_context *, const unsigned char *,
size_t),
void *p_sni);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
/**
* \brief Set the EC J-PAKE password for current handshake.
*
* \note An internal copy is made, and destroyed as soon as the
* handshake is completed, or when the SSL context is reset or
* freed.
*
* \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
* to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
* Password cannot be empty (see RFC 8236).
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param pw EC J-PAKE password (pre-shared secret). It cannot be empty
* \param pw_len length of pw in bytes
*
* \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *pw,
size_t pw_len);
/**
* \brief Set the EC J-PAKE opaque password for current handshake.
*
* \note The key must remain valid until the handshake is over.
*
* \note The SSL context needs to be already set up. The right place
* to call this function is between \c mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
* \c mbedtls_ssl_reset() and \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param pwd EC J-PAKE opaque password
*
* \return 0 on success, or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_set_hs_ecjpake_password_opaque(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_svc_key_id_t pwd);
#endif /*MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
/**
* \brief Set the supported Application Layer Protocols.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param protos Pointer to a NULL-terminated list of supported protocols,
* in decreasing preference order. The pointer to the list is
* recorded by the library for later reference as required, so
* the lifetime of the table must be at least as long as the
* lifetime of the SSL configuration structure.
*
* \return 0 on success, or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_alpn_protocols(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, const char **protos);
/**
* \brief Get the name of the negotiated Application Layer Protocol.
* This function should be called after the handshake is
* completed.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Protocol name, or NULL if no protocol was negotiated.
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_alpn_protocol(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
static inline const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile profile)
{
switch (profile) {
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80:
return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80";
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32:
return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_32";
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80:
return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_80";
case MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32:
return "MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_NULL_HMAC_SHA1_32";
default: break;
}
return "";
}
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C */
/**
* \brief Manage support for mki(master key id) value
* in use_srtp extension.
* MKI is an optional part of SRTP used for key management
* and re-keying. See RFC3711 section 3.1 for details.
* The default value is
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED.
*
* \param conf The SSL configuration to manage mki support.
* \param support_mki_value Enable or disable mki usage. Values are
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_UNSUPPORTED
* or #MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_srtp_mki_value_supported(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int support_mki_value);
/**
* \brief Set the supported DTLS-SRTP protection profiles.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param profiles Pointer to a List of MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET terminated
* supported protection profiles
* in decreasing preference order.
* The pointer to the list is recorded by the library
* for later reference as required, so the lifetime
* of the table must be at least as long as the lifetime
* of the SSL configuration structure.
* The list must not hold more than
* MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH elements
* (excluding the terminating MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET).
*
* \return 0 on success
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA when the list of
* protection profiles is incorrect.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles
(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile *profiles);
/**
* \brief Set the mki_value for the current DTLS-SRTP session.
*
* \param ssl SSL context to use.
* \param mki_value The MKI value to set.
* \param mki_len The length of the MKI value.
*
* \note This function is relevant on client side only.
* The server discovers the mki value during handshake.
* A mki value set on server side using this function
* is ignored.
*
* \return 0 on success
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_dtls_srtp_set_mki_value(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *mki_value,
uint16_t mki_len);
/**
* \brief Get the negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
* Protection profile and MKI value.
*
* \warning This function must be called after the handshake is
* completed. The value returned by this function must
* not be trusted or acted upon before the handshake completes.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query.
* \param dtls_srtp_info The negotiated DTLS-SRTP information:
* - Protection profile in use.
* A direct mapping of the iana defined value for protection
* profile on an uint16_t.
http://www.iana.org/assignments/srtp-protection/srtp-protection.xhtml
* #MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET if the use of SRTP was not negotiated
* or peer's Hello packet was not parsed yet.
* - mki size and value( if size is > 0 ).
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_get_dtls_srtp_negotiation_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_dtls_srtp_info *dtls_srtp_info);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
* and/or accepted at the server side.
*
* See also the documentation of mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version().
*
* \note This ignores ciphersuites from higher versions.
*
* \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
* \param minor Minor version number
* (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
*/
void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
int minor);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/**
* \brief Set the maximum supported version sent from the client side
* and/or accepted at the server side.
*
* \note After the handshake, you can call
* mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
* negotiated.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
* (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_tls_version) = tls_version;
}
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED)
/**
* \brief Set the minimum accepted SSL/TLS protocol version
*
* \note By default, all supported versions are accepted.
* Future versions of the library may disable older
* protocol versions by default if they become deprecated.
*
* \note The following versions are supported (if enabled at
* compile time):
* - (D)TLS 1.2: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
* \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3
* - TLS 1.3: \p major = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
* \p minor = #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4
*
* Note that the numbers in the constant names are the
* TLS internal protocol numbers, and the minor versions
* differ by one from the human-readable versions!
*
* \note Input outside of the SSL_MAX_XXXXX_VERSION and
* SSL_MIN_XXXXX_VERSION range is ignored.
*
* \note After the handshake, you can call
* mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
* negotiated.
*
* \note This function is deprecated and has been replaced by
* \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param major Major version number (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3)
* \param minor Minor version number
* (#MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 for (D)TLS 1.2,
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_4 for TLS 1.3)
*/
void MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int major,
int minor);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_DEPRECATED_REMOVED */
/**
* \brief Set the minimum supported version sent from the client side
* and/or accepted at the server side.
*
* \note After the handshake, you can call
* mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number() to see what version was
* negotiated.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param tls_version TLS protocol version number (\c mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version)
* (#MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN is not valid)
*/
static inline void mbedtls_ssl_conf_min_tls_version(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version tls_version)
{
conf->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(min_tls_version) = tls_version;
}
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
/**
* \brief Enable or disable Encrypt-then-MAC
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED)
*
* \note This should always be enabled, it is a security
* improvement, and should not cause any interoperability
* issue (used only if the peer supports it too).
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param etm MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_encrypt_then_mac(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char etm);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
/**
* \brief Enable or disable Extended Master Secret negotiation.
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED)
*
* \note This should always be enabled, it is a security fix to the
* protocol, and should not cause any interoperability issue
* (used only if the peer supports it too).
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param ems MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED or MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_extended_master_secret(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, char ems);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Whether to send a list of acceptable CAs in
* CertificateRequest messages.
* (Default: do send)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param cert_req_ca_list MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_ENABLED or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_REQ_CA_LIST_DISABLED
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_cert_req_ca_list(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
char cert_req_ca_list);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
/**
* \brief Set the maximum fragment length to emit and/or negotiate.
* (Typical: the smaller of #MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN and
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, usually `2^14` bytes)
* (Server: set maximum fragment length to emit,
* usually negotiated by the client during handshake)
* (Client: set maximum fragment length to emit *and*
* negotiate with the server during handshake)
* (Default: #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE)
*
* \note On the client side, the maximum fragment length extension
* *will not* be used, unless the maximum fragment length has
* been set via this function to a value different than
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE.
*
* \note With TLS, this currently only affects ApplicationData (sent
* with \c mbedtls_ssl_read()), not handshake messages.
* With DTLS, this affects both ApplicationData and handshake.
*
* \note This sets the maximum length for a record's payload,
* excluding record overhead that will be added to it, see
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion().
*
* \note For DTLS, it is also possible to set a limit for the total
* size of datagrams passed to the transport layer, including
* record overhead, see \c mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param mfl_code Code for maximum fragment length (allowed values:
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_512, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_1024,
* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_2048, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_4096)
*
* \return 0 if successful or MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_conf_max_frag_len(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, unsigned char mfl_code);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Pick the ciphersuites order according to the second parameter
* in the SSL Server module (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C).
* (Default, if never called: MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param order Server or client (MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_SERVER
* or MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_CIPHERSUITE_ORDER_CLIENT)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_preference_order(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int order);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Enable / Disable TLS 1.2 session tickets (client only,
* TLS 1.2 only). Enabled by default.
*
* \note On server, use \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets_cb().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param use_tickets Enable or disable (#MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int use_tickets);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/**
* \brief Enable / Disable handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages
* (client only, TLS 1.3 only).
*
* The handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket messages is disabled by
* default.
*
* In TLS 1.3, servers may send a NewSessionTicket message at any time,
* and may send multiple NewSessionTicket messages. By default, TLS 1.3
* clients ignore NewSessionTicket messages.
*
* To support session tickets in TLS 1.3 clients, call this function
* with #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED. When
* this is enabled, when a client receives a NewSessionTicket message,
* the next call to a message processing functions (notably
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and mbedtls_ssl_read()) will return
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET. The client should then
* call mbedtls_ssl_get_session() to retrieve the session ticket before
* calling the same message processing function again.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param signal_new_session_tickets Enable or disable
* (#MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_ENABLED or
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_SIGNAL_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets(
mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int signal_new_session_tickets);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3 */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS && MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) && \
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3)
/**
* \brief Number of NewSessionTicket messages for the server to send
* after handshake completion.
*
* \note The default value is
* \c MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS1_3_DEFAULT_NEW_SESSION_TICKETS.
*
* \note In case of a session resumption, this setting only partially apply.
* At most one ticket is sent in that case to just renew the pool of
* tickets of the client. The rationale is to avoid the number of
* tickets on the server to become rapidly out of control when the
* server has the same configuration for all its connection instances.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param num_tickets Number of NewSessionTicket.
*
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_new_session_tickets(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
uint16_t num_tickets);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS &&
MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C &&
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_3*/
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/**
* \brief Enable / Disable renegotiation support for connection when
* initiated by peer
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
*
* \warning It is recommended to always disable renegotiation unless you
* know you need it and you know what you're doing. In the
* past, there have been several issues associated with
* renegotiation or a poor understanding of its properties.
*
* \note Server-side, enabling renegotiation also makes the server
* susceptible to a resource DoS by a malicious client.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param renegotiation Enable or disable (MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_ENABLED or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int renegotiation);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/**
* \brief Prevent or allow legacy renegotiation.
* (Default: MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION)
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION allows connections to
* be established even if the peer does not support
* secure renegotiation, but does not allow renegotiation
* to take place if not secure.
* (Interoperable and secure option)
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_ALLOW_RENEGOTIATION allows renegotiations
* with non-upgraded peers. Allowing legacy renegotiation
* makes the connection vulnerable to specific man in the
* middle attacks. (See RFC 5746)
* (Most interoperable and least secure option)
*
* MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE breaks off connections
* if peer does not support secure renegotiation. Results
* in interoperability issues with non-upgraded peers
* that do not support renegotiation altogether.
* (Most secure option, interoperability issues)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param allow_legacy Prevent or allow (SSL_NO_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION,
* SSL_ALLOW_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE)
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_legacy_renegotiation(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int allow_legacy);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/**
* \brief Enforce renegotiation requests.
* (Default: enforced, max_records = 16)
*
* When we request a renegotiation, the peer can comply or
* ignore the request. This function allows us to decide
* whether to enforce our renegotiation requests by closing
* the connection if the peer doesn't comply.
*
* However, records could already be in transit from the peer
* when the request is emitted. In order to increase
* reliability, we can accept a number of records before the
* expected handshake records.
*
* The optimal value is highly dependent on the specific usage
* scenario.
*
* \note With DTLS and server-initiated renegotiation, the
* HelloRequest is retransmitted every time mbedtls_ssl_read() times
* out or receives Application Data, until:
* - max_records records have beens seen, if it is >= 0, or
* - the number of retransmits that would happen during an
* actual handshake has been reached.
* Please remember the request might be lost a few times
* if you consider setting max_records to a really low value.
*
* \warning On client, the grace period can only happen during
* mbedtls_ssl_read(), as opposed to mbedtls_ssl_write() and mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate()
* which always behave as if max_record was 0. The reason is,
* if we receive application data from the server, we need a
* place to write it, which only happens during mbedtls_ssl_read().
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param max_records Use MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_NOT_ENFORCED if you don't want to
* enforce renegotiation, or a non-negative value to enforce
* it but allow for a grace period of max_records records.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_enforced(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, int max_records);
/**
* \brief Set record counter threshold for periodic renegotiation.
* (Default: 2^48 - 1)
*
* Renegotiation is automatically triggered when a record
* counter (outgoing or incoming) crosses the defined
* threshold. The default value is meant to prevent the
* connection from being closed when the counter is about to
* reached its maximal value (it is not allowed to wrap).
*
* Lower values can be used to enforce policies such as "keys
* must be refreshed every N packets with cipher X".
*
* The renegotiation period can be disabled by setting
* conf->disable_renegotiation to
* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED.
*
* \note When the configured transport is
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM the maximum renegotiation
* period is 2^48 - 1, and for MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM,
* the maximum renegotiation period is 2^64 - 1.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration
* \param period The threshold value: a big-endian 64-bit number.
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_conf_renegotiation_period(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
const unsigned char period[8]);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/**
* \brief Check if there is data already read from the
* underlying transport but not yet processed.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if nothing's pending, 1 otherwise.
*
* \note This is different in purpose and behaviour from
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail in that it considers
* any kind of unprocessed data, not only unread
* application data. If \c mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes
* returns a non-zero value, this function will
* also signal pending data, but the converse does
* not hold. For example, in DTLS there might be
* further records waiting to be processed from
* the current underlying transport's datagram.
*
* \note If this function returns 1 (data pending), this
* does not imply that a subsequent call to
* \c mbedtls_ssl_read will provide any data;
* e.g., the unprocessed data might turn out
* to be an alert or a handshake message.
*
* \note This function is useful in the following situation:
* If the SSL/TLS module successfully returns from an
* operation - e.g. a handshake or an application record
* read - and you're awaiting incoming data next, you
* must not immediately idle on the underlying transport
* to have data ready, but you need to check the value
* of this function first. The reason is that the desired
* data might already be read but not yet processed.
* If, in contrast, a previous call to the SSL/TLS module
* returned MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, it is not necessary
* to call this function, as the latter error code entails
* that all internal data has been processed.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_check_pending(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the number of application data bytes
* remaining to be read from the current record.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return How many bytes are available in the application
* data record read buffer.
*
* \note When working over a datagram transport, this is
* useful to detect the current datagram's boundary
* in case \c mbedtls_ssl_read has written the maximal
* amount of data fitting into the input buffer.
*
*/
size_t mbedtls_ssl_get_bytes_avail(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the result of the certificate verification
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use.
*
* \return \c 0 if the certificate verification was successful.
* \return \c -1u if the result is not available. This may happen
* e.g. if the handshake aborts early, or a verification
* callback returned a fatal error.
* \return A bitwise combination of \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCERT_XXX
* and \c MBEDTLS_X509_BADCRL_XXX failure flags; see x509.h.
*/
uint32_t mbedtls_ssl_get_verify_result(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the id of the current ciphersuite
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return a ciphersuite id
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_id_from_ssl(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the name of the current ciphersuite
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return a string containing the ciphersuite name
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the (D)TLS protocol version negotiated in the
* given connection.
*
* \note If you call this function too early during the initial
* handshake, before the two sides have agreed on a version,
* this function returns #MBEDTLS_SSL_VERSION_UNKNOWN.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query.
* \return The negotiated protocol version.
*/
static inline mbedtls_ssl_protocol_version mbedtls_ssl_get_version_number(
const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(tls_version);
}
/**
* \brief Return the current TLS version
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return a string containing the TLS version
*/
const char *mbedtls_ssl_get_version(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the (maximum) number of bytes added by the record
* layer: header + encryption/MAC overhead (inc. padding)
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum record expansion in bytes
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the current maximum outgoing record payload in bytes.
*
* \note The logic to determine the maximum outgoing record payload is
* version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
* the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
* such as the max fragment length or record size limit extension if
* used, and for DTLS the path MTU as configured and current
* record expansion.
*
* \note With DTLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will return an error if
* called with a larger length value.
* With TLS, \c mbedtls_ssl_write() will fragment the input if
* necessary and return the number of bytes written; it is up
* to the caller to call \c mbedtls_ssl_write() again in
* order to send the remaining bytes if any.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum payload for an outgoing record,
* or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief Return the current maximum incoming record payload in bytes.
*
* \note The logic to determine the maximum incoming record payload is
* version-specific. It takes into account various factors, such as
* the mbedtls_config.h setting \c MBEDTLS_SSL_IN_CONTENT_LEN, extensions
* such as the max fragment length extension or record size limit
* extension if used, and the current record expansion.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_get_record_expansion()
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return Current maximum payload for an incoming record,
* or a negative error code.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_max_in_record_payload(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C)
/**
* \brief Return the peer certificate from the current connection.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to use. This must be initialized and setup.
*
* \return The current peer certificate, if available.
* The returned certificate is owned by the SSL context and
* is valid only until the next call to the SSL API.
* \return \c NULL if no peer certificate is available. This might
* be because the chosen ciphersuite doesn't use CRTs
* (PSK-based ciphersuites, for example), or because
* #MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE has been disabled,
* allowing the stack to free the peer's CRT to save memory.
*
* \note For one-time inspection of the peer's certificate during
* the handshake, consider registering an X.509 CRT verification
* callback through mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() instead of calling
* this function. Using mbedtls_ssl_conf_verify() also comes at
* the benefit of allowing you to influence the verification
* process, for example by masking expected and tolerated
* verification failures.
*
* \warning You must not use the pointer returned by this function
* after any further call to the SSL API, including
* mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write(); this is
* because the pointer might change during renegotiation,
* which happens transparently to the user.
* If you want to use the certificate across API calls,
* you must make a copy.
*/
const mbedtls_x509_crt *mbedtls_ssl_get_peer_cert(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Export a session in order to resume it later.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context representing the connection for which to
* to export a session structure for later resumption.
* \param session The target structure in which to store the exported session.
* This must have been initialized with mbedtls_ssl_session_init()
* but otherwise be unused.
*
* \note This function can handle a variety of mechanisms for session
* resumption: For TLS 1.2, both session ID-based resumption and
* ticket-based resumption will be considered. For TLS 1.3,
* sessions equate to tickets, and if session tickets are
* enabled (see #MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS configuration
* option), this function exports the last received ticket and
* the exported session may be used to resume the TLS 1.3
* session. If session tickets are disabled, exported sessions
* cannot be used to resume a TLS 1.3 session.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful. In this case, \p session can be used for
* session resumption by passing it to mbedtls_ssl_set_session(),
* and serialized for storage via mbedtls_ssl_session_save().
* \return Another negative error code on other kinds of failure.
*
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_set_session()
* \sa mbedtls_ssl_session_save()
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_session(const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
/**
* \brief Perform the SSL handshake
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED if DTLS is in use
* and the client did not demonstrate reachability yet - in
* this case you must stop using the context (see below).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
* NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
* documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
* about this error code.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* \note If DTLS is in use, then you may choose to handle
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED specially for logging
* purposes, as it is an expected return value rather than an
* actual error, but you still need to reset/free the context.
*
* \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
* If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
* and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
* signal a new event. This is not true for a successful handshake,
* in which case the datagram of the underlying transport that is
* currently being processed might or might not contain further
* DTLS records.
*
* \note If #MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO is enabled, the PSA crypto
* subsystem must have been initialized by calling
* psa_crypto_init() before calling this function.
* Otherwise, the handshake may call psa_crypto_init()
* if a negotiation involving TLS 1.3 takes place (this may
* be the case even if TLS 1.3 is offered but eventually
* not selected).
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
/**
* \brief After calling mbedtls_ssl_handshake() to start the SSL
* handshake you can call this function to check whether the
* handshake is over for a given SSL context. This function
* should be also used to determine when to stop calling
* mbedtls_handshake_step() for that context.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return \c 1 if handshake is over, \c 0 if it is still ongoing.
*/
static inline int mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl)
{
return ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) >= MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER;
}
/**
* \brief Perform a single step of the SSL handshake
*
* \note The state of the context (ssl->state) will be at
* the next state after this function returns \c 0. Do not
* call this function if mbedtls_ssl_is_handshake_over()
* returns \c 1.
*
* \warning Whilst in the past you may have used direct access to the
* context state (ssl->state) in order to ascertain when to
* stop calling this function and although you can still do
* so with something like ssl->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(state) or by
* defining MBEDTLS_ALLOW_PRIVATE_ACCESS, this is now
* considered deprecated and could be broken in any future
* release. If you still find you have good reason for such
* direct access, then please do contact the team to explain
* this (raise an issue or post to the mailing list), so that
* we can add a solution to your problem that will be
* guaranteed to work in the future.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return See mbedtls_ssl_handshake().
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
* or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
/**
* \brief Initiate an SSL renegotiation on the running connection.
* Client: perform the renegotiation right now.
* Server: request renegotiation, which will be performed
* during the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read() if honored by
* client.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if successful, or any mbedtls_ssl_handshake() return
* value except #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT that can't
* happen during a renegotiation.
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than \c 0,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it
* or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before
* re-using it for a new connection; the current connection
* must be closed.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_renegotiate(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
/**
* \brief Read at most 'len' application data bytes
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param buf buffer that will hold the data
* \param len maximum number of bytes to read
*
* \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
* \return \c 0 if the read end of the underlying transport was closed
* without sending a CloseNotify beforehand, which might happen
* because of various reasons (internal error of an underlying
* stack, non-conformant peer not sending a CloseNotify and
* such) - in this case you must stop using the context
* (see below).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY if the underlying
* transport is still functional, but the peer has
* acknowledged to not send anything anymore.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT if we're at the server
* side of a DTLS connection and the client is initiating a
* new connection using the same source port. See below.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
* NewSessionTicket message has been received.
* This error code is only returned on the client side. It is
* only returned if handling of TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
* messages has been enabled through
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_tls13_enable_signal_new_session_tickets().
* This error code indicates that a TLS 1.3 NewSessionTicket
* message has been received and parsed successfully by the
* client. The ticket data can be retrieved from the SSL
* context by calling mbedtls_ssl_get_session(). It remains
* available until the next call to mbedtls_ssl_read().
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* a positive value,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CLIENT_RECONNECT
* (which can only happen server-side), it means that a client
* is initiating a new connection using the same source port.
* You can either treat that as a connection close and wait
* for the client to resend a ClientHello, or directly
* continue with \c mbedtls_ssl_handshake() with the same
* context (as it has been reset internally). Either way, you
* must make sure this is seen by the application as a new
* connection: application state, if any, should be reset, and
* most importantly the identity of the client must be checked
* again. WARNING: not validating the identity of the client
* again, or not transmitting the new identity to the
* application layer, would allow authentication bypass!
*
* \note Remarks regarding event-driven DTLS:
* - If the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ, no datagram
* from the underlying transport layer is currently being processed,
* and it is safe to idle until the timer or the underlying transport
* signal a new event.
* - This function may return MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even if data was
* initially available on the underlying transport, as this data may have
* been only e.g. duplicated messages or a renegotiation request.
* Therefore, you must be prepared to receive MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ even
* when reacting to an incoming-data event from the underlying transport.
* - On success, the datagram of the underlying transport that is currently
* being processed may contain further DTLS records. You should call
* \c mbedtls_ssl_check_pending to check for remaining records.
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes
*
* \warning This function will do partial writes in some cases. If the
* return value is non-negative but less than length, the
* function must be called again with updated arguments:
* buf + ret, len - ret (if ret is the return value) until
* it returns a value equal to the last 'len' argument.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param buf buffer holding the data
* \param len how many bytes must be written
*
* \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
* successful (may be less than \p len).
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ or #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE
* if the handshake is incomplete and waiting for data to
* be available for reading from or writing to the underlying
* transport - in this case you must call this function again
* when the underlying transport is ready for the operation.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS if an asynchronous
* operation is in progress (see
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_async_private_cb()) - in this case you
* must call this function again when the operation is ready.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS if a cryptographic
* operation is in progress (see mbedtls_ecp_set_max_ops()) -
* in this case you must call this function again to complete
* the handshake when you're done attending other tasks.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET if a TLS 1.3
* NewSessionTicket message has been received. See the
* documentation of mbedtls_ssl_read() for more information
* about this error code.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA if early data, as
* defined in RFC 8446 (TLS 1.3 specification), has been
* received as part of the handshake. This is server specific
* and may occur only if the early data feature has been
* enabled on server (see mbedtls_ssl_conf_early_data()
* documentation). You must call mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data()
* to read the early data before resuming the handshake.
* \return Another SSL error code - in this case you must stop using
* the context (see below).
*
* \warning If this function returns something other than
* a non-negative value,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ASYNC_IN_PROGRESS,
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_NEW_SESSION_TICKET or
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA,
* you must stop using the SSL context for reading or writing,
* and either free it or call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset()
* on it before re-using it for a new connection; the current
* connection must be closed.
*
* \note When this function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE/READ,
* it must be called later with the *same* arguments,
* until it returns a value greater than or equal to 0. When
* the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_WRITE there may be
* some partial data in the output buffer, however this is not
* yet sent.
*
* \note If the requested length is greater than the maximum
* fragment length (either the built-in limit or the one set
* or negotiated with the peer), then:
* - with TLS, less bytes than requested are written.
* - with DTLS, MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA is returned.
* \c mbedtls_ssl_get_max_out_record_payload() may be used to
* query the active maximum fragment length.
*
* \note Attempting to write 0 bytes will result in an empty TLS
* application record being sent.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Send an alert message
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param level The alert level of the message
* (MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_WARNING or MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL)
* \param message The alert message (SSL_ALERT_MSG_*)
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
* call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
* for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char level,
unsigned char message);
/**
* \brief Notify the peer that the connection is being closed
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*
* \return 0 if successful, or a specific SSL error code.
*
* \note If this function returns something other than 0 or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WANT_READ/WRITE, you must stop using
* the SSL context for reading or writing, and either free it or
* call \c mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on it before re-using it
* for a new connection; the current connection must be closed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_close_notify(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA)
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C)
/**
* \brief Read at most 'len' bytes of early data
*
* \note This API is server specific.
*
* \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
* IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
*
* The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
* those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
* - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
* solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
* - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
* Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
* is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
* does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
* weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
* data is authenticated either with TLS client
* authentication or inside the application protocol. The
* same warnings apply to any use of the
* early_exporter_master_secret.
*
* \warning Mbed TLS does not implement any of the anti-replay defenses
* defined in section 8 of the TLS 1.3 specification:
* single-use of tickets or ClientHello recording within a
* given time window.
*
* \note This function is used in conjunction with
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake(), mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(),
* mbedtls_ssl_read() and mbedtls_ssl_write() to read early
* data when these functions return
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
*
* \param ssl SSL context, it must have been initialized and set up.
* \param buf buffer that will hold the data
* \param len maximum number of bytes to read
*
* \return The (positive) number of bytes read if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_READ_EARLY_DATA if it is not
* possible to read early data for the SSL context \p ssl. Note
* that this function is intended to be called for an SSL
* context \p ssl only after a call to mbedtls_ssl_handshake(),
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake_step(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
* mbedtls_ssl_write() for \p ssl that has returned
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_RECEIVED_EARLY_DATA.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_read_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
/**
* \brief Try to write exactly 'len' application data bytes while
* performing the handshake (early data).
*
* \warning Early data is defined in the TLS 1.3 specification, RFC 8446.
* IMPORTANT NOTE from section 2.3 of the specification:
*
* The security properties for 0-RTT data are weaker than
* those for other kinds of TLS data. Specifically:
* - This data is not forward secret, as it is encrypted
* solely under keys derived using the offered PSK.
* - There are no guarantees of non-replay between connections.
* Protection against replay for ordinary TLS 1.3 1-RTT data
* is provided via the server's Random value, but 0-RTT data
* does not depend on the ServerHello and therefore has
* weaker guarantees. This is especially relevant if the
* data is authenticated either with TLS client
* authentication or inside the application protocol. The
* same warnings apply to any use of the
* early_exporter_master_secret.
*
* \note This function behaves mainly as mbedtls_ssl_write(). The
* specification of mbedtls_ssl_write() relevant to TLS 1.3
* (thus not the parts specific to (D)TLS1.2) applies to this
* function and the present documentation is mainly restricted
* to the differences with mbedtls_ssl_write(). One noticeable
* difference though is that mbedtls_ssl_write() aims to
* complete the handshake before to write application data
* while mbedtls_ssl_write_early() aims to drive the handshake
* just past the point where it is not possible to send early
* data anymore.
*
* \param ssl SSL context
* \param buf buffer holding the data
* \param len how many bytes must be written
*
* \return The (non-negative) number of bytes actually written if
* successful (may be less than \p len).
*
* \return One additional specific error code compared to
* mbedtls_ssl_write():
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA.
*
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CANNOT_WRITE_EARLY_DATA is returned when it
* is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
* \p ssl.
*
* It may have been possible and it is not possible
* anymore because the client received the server Finished
* message, the server rejected early data or the maximum
* number of allowed early data for the PSK in use has been
* reached.
*
* It may never have been possible and will never be possible
* for the SSL context \p ssl because the use of early data
* is disabled for that context or more generally the context
* is not suitably configured to enable early data or the first
* call to the function was done while the handshake was
* already completed.
*
* It is not possible to write early data for the SSL context
* \p ssl and any subsequent call to this API will return this
* error code. But this does not preclude for using it with
* mbedtls_ssl_write(), mbedtls_ssl_read() or
* mbedtls_ssl_handshake() and the handshake can be
* completed by calling one of these APIs.
*
* \note This function may write early data only if the SSL context
* has been configured for the handshake with a PSK for which
* early data is allowed.
*
* \note To maximize the number of early data that can be written in
* the course of the handshake, it is expected that this
* function starts the handshake for the SSL context \p ssl.
* But this is not mandatory.
*
* \note This function does not provide any information on whether
* the server has accepted or will accept early data or not.
* When it returns a positive value, it just means that it
* has written early data to the server. To know whether the
* server has accepted early data or not, you should call
* mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status() with the handshake
* completed.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
/**
* \brief Get the status of the negotiation of the use of early data.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to query
*
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
* from the server-side.
*
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if this function is called
* prior to completion of the handshake.
*
* \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_NOT_INDICATED if the client
* has not indicated the use of early data to the server.
*
* \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_ACCEPTED if the client has
* indicated the use of early data and the server has accepted
* it.
*
* \return #MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATUS_REJECTED if the client has
* indicated the use of early data but the server has rejected
* it. In this situation, the client may want to re-send the
* early data it may have tried to send by calling
* mbedtls_ssl_write_early_data() as ordinary post-handshake
* application data by calling mbedtls_ssl_write().
*
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_get_early_data_status(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EARLY_DATA */
/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL context and clear memory
*
* \param ssl SSL context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_free(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl);
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION)
/**
* \brief Save an active connection as serialized data in a buffer.
* This allows the freeing or re-using of the SSL context
* while still picking up the connection later in a way that
* it entirely transparent to the peer.
*
* \see mbedtls_ssl_context_load()
*
* \note The serialized data only contains the data that is
* necessary to resume the connection: negotiated protocol
* options, session identifier, keys, etc.
* Loading a saved SSL context does not restore settings and
* state related to how the application accesses the context,
* such as configured callback functions, user data, pending
* incoming or outgoing data, etc.
*
* \note This feature is currently only available under certain
* conditions, see the documentation of the return value
* #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA for details.
*
* \note When this function succeeds, it calls
* mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on \p ssl which as a result is
* no longer associated with the connection that has been
* serialized. This avoids creating copies of the connection
* state. You're then free to either re-use the context
* structure for a different connection, or call
* mbedtls_ssl_free() on it. See the documentation of
* mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() for more details.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context to save. On success, it is no longer
* associated with the connection that has been serialized.
* \param buf The buffer to write the serialized data to. It must be a
* writeable buffer of at least \p buf_len bytes, or may be \c
* NULL if \p buf_len is \c 0.
* \param buf_len The number of bytes available for writing in \p buf.
* \param olen The size in bytes of the data that has been or would have
* been written. It must point to a valid \c size_t.
*
* \note \p olen is updated to the correct value regardless of
* whether \p buf_len was large enough. This makes it possible
* to determine the necessary size by calling this function
* with \p buf set to \c NULL and \p buf_len to \c 0. However,
* the value of \p olen is only guaranteed to be correct when
* the function returns #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL or
* \c 0. If the return value is different, then the value of
* \p olen is undefined.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL if \p buf is too small.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed
* while resetting the context.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if a handshake is in
* progress, or there is pending data for reading or sending,
* or the connection does not use DTLS 1.2 with an AEAD
* ciphersuite, or renegotiation is enabled.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_context_save(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
unsigned char *buf,
size_t buf_len,
size_t *olen);
/**
* \brief Load serialized connection data to an SSL context.
*
* \see mbedtls_ssl_context_save()
*
* \warning The same serialized data must never be loaded into more
* that one context. In order to ensure that, after
* successfully loading serialized data to an SSL context, you
* should immediately destroy or invalidate all copies of the
* serialized data that was loaded. Loading the same data in
* more than one context would cause severe security failures
* including but not limited to loss of confidentiality.
*
* \note Before calling this function, the SSL context must be
* prepared in one of the two following ways. The first way is
* to take a context freshly initialised with
* mbedtls_ssl_init() and call mbedtls_ssl_setup() on it with
* the same ::mbedtls_ssl_config structure that was used in
* the original connection. The second way is to
* call mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() on a context that was
* previously prepared as above but used in the meantime.
* Either way, you must not use the context to perform a
* handshake between calling mbedtls_ssl_setup() or
* mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and calling this function. You
* may however call other setter functions in that time frame
* as indicated in the note below.
*
* \note Before or after calling this function successfully, you
* also need to configure some connection-specific callbacks
* and settings before you can use the connection again
* (unless they were already set before calling
* mbedtls_ssl_session_reset() and the values are suitable for
* the present connection). Specifically, you want to call
* at least mbedtls_ssl_set_bio(),
* mbedtls_ssl_set_timer_cb(), and
* mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_n() or
* mbedtls_ssl_set_user_data_p() if they were set originally.
* All other SSL setter functions
* are not necessary to call, either because they're only used
* in handshakes, or because the setting is already saved. You
* might choose to call them anyway, for example in order to
* share code between the cases of establishing a new
* connection and the case of loading an already-established
* connection.
*
* \note If you have new information about the path MTU, you want to
* call mbedtls_ssl_set_mtu() after calling this function, as
* otherwise this function would overwrite your
* newly-configured value with the value that was active when
* the context was saved.
*
* \note When this function returns an error code, it calls
* mbedtls_ssl_free() on \p ssl. In this case, you need to
* prepare the context with the usual sequence starting with a
* call to mbedtls_ssl_init() if you want to use it again.
*
* \param ssl The SSL context structure to be populated. It must have
* been prepared as described in the note above.
* \param buf The buffer holding the serialized connection data. It must
* be a readable buffer of at least \p len bytes.
* \param len The size of the serialized data in bytes.
*
* \return \c 0 if successful.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED if memory allocation failed.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_VERSION_MISMATCH if the serialized data
* comes from a different Mbed TLS version or build.
* \return #MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA if input data is invalid.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_context_load(mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
const unsigned char *buf,
size_t len);
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CONTEXT_SERIALIZATION */
/**
* \brief Initialize an SSL configuration context
* Just makes the context ready for
* mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() or mbedtls_ssl_config_free().
*
* \note You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults() unless you
* manually set all of the relevant fields yourself.
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_config_init(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
/**
* \brief Load reasonable default SSL configuration values.
* (You need to call mbedtls_ssl_config_init() first.)
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
* \param endpoint MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_CLIENT or MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER
* \param transport MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM for TLS, or
* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM for DTLS
* \param preset a MBEDTLS_SSL_PRESET_XXX value
*
* \note See \c mbedtls_ssl_conf_transport() for notes on DTLS.
*
* \return 0 if successful, or
* MBEDTLS_ERR_XXX_ALLOC_FAILED on memory allocation error.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf,
int endpoint, int transport, int preset);
/**
* \brief Free an SSL configuration context
*
* \param conf SSL configuration context
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_config_free(mbedtls_ssl_config *conf);
/**
* \brief Initialize SSL session structure
*
* \param session SSL session
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_session_init(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
/**
* \brief Free referenced items in an SSL session including the
* peer certificate and clear memory
*
* \note A session object can be freed even if the SSL context
* that was used to retrieve the session is still in use.
*
* \param session SSL session
*/
void mbedtls_ssl_session_free(mbedtls_ssl_session *session);
/**
* \brief TLS-PRF function for key derivation.
*
* \param prf The tls_prf type function type to be used.
* \param secret Secret for the key derivation function.
* \param slen Length of the secret.
* \param label String label for the key derivation function,
* terminated with null character.
* \param random Random bytes.
* \param rlen Length of the random bytes buffer.
* \param dstbuf The buffer holding the derived key.
* \param dlen Length of the output buffer.
*
* \return 0 on success. An SSL specific error on failure.
*/
int mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf(const mbedtls_tls_prf_types prf,
const unsigned char *secret, size_t slen,
const char *label,
const unsigned char *random, size_t rlen,
unsigned char *dstbuf, size_t dlen);
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif /* ssl.h */